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> Context • The alleged dichotomy between mind and matter is pervasive. Therefore, the attempt to explain mat-
ter in terms of mind (idealism) is often considered a mirror image of that of explaining mind in terms of mat-
ter (mainstream physicalism), in the sense of being structurally equivalent despite being reversely arranged.
> Problem • I argue that this is an error arising from language artifacts, for dichotomies must reside in the same level 
of abstraction. > Method • I show that, because matter outside mind is not an empirical observation but rather an 
explanatory model, the epistemic symmetry between the two is broken. Consequently, matter and mind cannot reside 
in the same level of abstraction. > Results • It then becomes clear that attempting to explain mind in terms of matter 
is epistemically more costly than attempting to explain matter in terms of mind. > Implications • The qualities of ex-
perience are suggested to be not only epistemically, but also ontologically primary. > Constructivist content • I high-
light the primacy of perceptual constructs over explanatory abstraction on both epistemic and ontic levels.
> Key words • Idealism, physicalism, pancomputationalism, anti-realism, hard problem of consciousness, epistemic 
symmetry, explanatory abstraction, levels of abstraction.
Introduction
« 1 » The (unexamined) assumption 
that mind and matter are jointly exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive concepts is perva-
sive today. In other words, many scholars 
implicitly take every aspect of existence to 
be either mental (e.g., thoughts, emotions, 
hallucinations) or physical (e.g., tables and 
chairs), mentality and physicality being 
polar opposites in some sense. Originating 
with René Descartes and Immanuel Kant 
(Walls 2003: 130), this dichotomy has been 
firmly entrenched in Western thought since 
at least the early nineteenth century. Emi-
nent scholarly publications of the time, such 
as The British Cyclopædia of Natural History, 
lay it out unambiguously: “as mind is the op-
posite of matter in definition, the perfection 
of its exercise must be the opposite of that 
of the exercise of matter” (Partington 1837: 
161). From the early twentieth century on-
wards, more nuanced formulations of the 
dichotomy were proposed. Alfred North 
Whitehead (1947), for instance, considered 
mind and matter co-dependent opposites. 
Even Henri Bergson, whose conception of 
an élan vital was meant to dilute the Car-
tesian split, was careful not to completely 
eradicate the dichotomy (Catani 2013: 94).
« 2 » Indeed, this trend towards more 
nuanced formulations endures to this day. 
Philosopher David Chalmers, for instance, 
wrote that the “failure of materialism leads 
to a kind of dualism: there are both physi-
cal and nonphysical [i.e., mental] features 
of the world” (Chalmers 1996: 124). He 
speaks of property dualism (Ibid.: 125) to 
distinguish it from the discredited sub-
stance dualism of Descartes. Nonetheless, 
the essence of the dichotomy persists intact. 
Public endorsements of property dualism 
by influential science spokespeople, such as 
neuroscientists Christof Koch (2012: 152) 
and Sam Harris,1 lend academic legitimacy 
to it. Harris, for instance, claims that mind 
and matter each represent “half of reality,” 
making the implicit assumption that they 
have comparable epistemic status (that is, 
that matter is as confidently knowable as 
mind). So pervasive is this assumption that 
1 | See Harris’s video titled “You Are More 
Than Your Brain” on Big Think, 4 September 2016, 
available at https://www.facebook.com/BigThink-
dotcom/videos/10153879575418527
it has become integral to our shared cultural 
intuitions.
« 3 » Whilst a fundamental dichotomy 
between mind and matter is readily accepted 
by large segments of the population – perhaps 
for psychological reasons (Heflick et al. 2015) 
– in philosophical circles the correspond-
ing dualism is properly regarded as unpar-
simonious. For this reason, philosophy has 
historically attempted to explain one mem-
ber of the alleged dichotomy in terms of the 
other. The ontology of idealism, for instance, 
attempts to reduce “all sense data to mental 
contents” (Tarnas 2010: 335), whereas main-
stream physicalism – perhaps better labelled 
as “materialism,” but which I shall continue 
to refer to as “mainstream physicalism” for 
the sake of consistency with some of the rel-
evant literature – attempts to reduce all men-
tal contents to material arrangements (Stoljar 
2016). To be more specific, idealism entails 
that mind is nature’s fundamental ontological 
ground, everything else being reducible to, 
or grounded in, mind, whereas mainstream 
physicalism posits that nature’s fundamen-
tal ontological ground is matter outside and 
independent of mind, everything else being 
reducible to, or grounded in, matter.
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« 4 » The problem is that the ingrained 
cultural intuition that mind and matter have 
comparable epistemic status tends to creep 
– unexamined – even into philosophical 
thought, leading to the tacit conclusion that 
idealism and mainstream physicalism are 
mirror images of each other, in the sense of 
being structurally equivalent despite being 
reversely arranged. In the present essay, I 
contend that this tacit conclusion is false be-
cause it overlooks important epistemic con-
siderations: we do not – and fundamentally 
cannot – know matter as confidently as we 
know mind. By incorrectly positing that ide-
alism incurs an epistemic cost comparable 
to that of mainstream physicalism in at least 
some important sense, the tacit conclusion 
undervalues idealism and overvalues physi-
calism. This confusion may be a key enabler 
of physicalism’s success in underpinning our 
present-day mainstream worldview. Once 
the tacit conclusion is properly examined 
and rectified, as attempted in this essay, ide-
alism may emerge as a more plausible ontol-
ogy than mainstream physicalism, at least in 
terms of its epistemic cost.
« 5 » Like Gilbert Ryle (2009), I argue 
that mind and matter do not form a dichot-
omy. My argument, however, does not de-
pend – as Ryle’s controversially does (Web-
ster 1995: 483) – on equating mind with 
behaviours. Indeed, Ryle attempts to refute 
the alleged dichotomy by effectively relegat-
ing mind to the status of mere illusion (ibid: 
461). My argument, instead, rests on the 
notion that mind and matter are not epis-
temically symmetrical – a concept I shall 
formally define in the section titled “Dispel-
ling the mind-matter dichotomy” – as mem-
bers of a dichotomy must be. I do not deny 
mind, because it is epistemically primary: all 
knowledge presupposes mind.
« 6 » That the notion of physically ob-
jective matter – that is, matter outside and 
independent of mind – is now largely taken 
for granted suggests cultural acclimatiza-
tion to what is a mere hypothesis. After all, 
physically objective matter is not empirically 
observable, but a conceptual explanatory 
device abstracted from the patterns and reg-
ularities of empirical observations – that is, 
an explanatory abstraction (Glasersfeld 1984; 
more on this in the section titled “Levels of 
explanatory abstraction”). Indeed, there 
seems to be a growing tendency in science 
today to mistake explanatory abstraction for 
what is available to us empirically. This has 
been extensively documented before, but 
mostly in regard to clearly speculative ideas 
such as superstring theory and multiverse 
cosmologies (Smolin 2007). When it comes 
to the everyday notion of physically objec-
tive matter, however, many fail to see the 
same conflation at work.
« 7 » To illustrate and highlight the con-
flation with an admittedly extreme example, 
the next section briefly reviews the ontology 
of pancomputationalism, which posits un-
grounded computation as the primary ele-
ment of existence (Piccinini 2015). Indeed, 
the idea of replacing physicalism with ontic 
pancomputationalism should provide a vis-
ceral demonstration of the epistemic cost 
of substituting explanatory abstraction for 
empirical observation. In this context, my 
suggestion is that an analogous epistemic 
disparity exists between idealism and main-
stream physicalism. In other words, if one is 
convinced that ontic pancomputationalism 
is absurd in comparison to physicalism, then 
– and on the same basis – one has reason 
to question the plausibility of mainstream 
physicalism in comparison to idealism.
« 8 » The section titled “Levels of ex-
planatory abstraction” then elaborates more 
systematically on the different planes of ab-
stract explanations used in science and phi-
losophy. It provides the basis for the refuta-
tion of the alleged dichotomy between mind 
and matter later carried out in the section 
titled “Dispelling the mind-matter dichoto-
my,” which forms the core of this essay. Fi-
nally, the Conclusion sums it all up.
« 9 » Before we start, however, some 
terminology clarifications are needed. 
Throughout this essay, I use the word “mind” 
in the sense of phenomenal consciousness. 
Following Thomas Nagel’s (1974) original 
definition of the latter – which has since 
been further popularized by Chalmers 
(1996, 2003) – I stipulate that, if there is 
anything it is like to be a certain entity, then 
the entity is minded. As such, mind – as the 
word is used here – is epistemically primary, 
an assertion further substantiated in the 
section titled “Levels of explanatory abstrac-
tion.” In this sense, mind does not neces-
sarily entail higher-level functions such as 
metacognition – that is, the knowledge of 
one’s knowledge (Schooler 2002: 340) – or 
even a conscious sense of self as distinct 
from the world. It necessarily entails only 
the presence of phenomenal properties, in 
that it is defined as the substrate or ground 
of experience. Moreover, insofar as what we 
call “concreteness” is itself a phenomenal 
property associated with the degree of clar-
ity or vividness of experience, mind is the 
sole ground of concreteness. Anything al-
legedly non-mental cannot, by definition, be 
concrete, but is abstract instead, in the sense 
of lacking phenomenal properties.
« 10 » I am well aware that the word 
“mind” is used in entirely different ways – 
often decoupled from experience – in other 
contexts, such as philosophy of biology 
(Godfrey-Smith 2014) and artificial intel-
ligence (Franklin 1997). Yet, I believe the 
usage I am defining here is adequate for the 
context of the present article. And given this 
usage, experience can be coherently regard-
ed as an excitation of mind, whereas mind 
can be coherently regarded as the substrate 
or ground of experience.
The epistemic cost of 
explanation by abstraction
« 11 » By postulating a material world 
outside mind and obeying laws of physics, 
physicalism can accommodate the patterns 
and regularities of perceptual experience. 
But it fails to accommodate experience itself. 
This is called the “hard problem of con-
sciousness” and there is now a vast literature 
on it (e.g., Levine 1983; Rosenberg 2004: 
13–30; Strawson 2006: 2–30). In a nutshell, 
the qualities of experience are irreducible to 
the parameters of material arrangements – 
whatever the arrangement is – in the sense 
that it is impossible, even in principle, to de-
duce those qualities from these parameters 
(Chalmers 2003).
« 12 » As I elaborate in the section titled 
“Dispelling the mind-matter dichotomy,” 
the “hard problem” is not merely hard, but 
fundamentally insoluble, arising as it does 
from the very failure to distinguish explana-
tory abstraction from empirical observation 
discussed in this article. As such, it implies 
that we cannot, even in principle, explain 
mind in terms of matter. But because the 
contemporary cultural ethos entails the no-
tion that mind and matter constitute a di-
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chotomy, one may feel tempted to conclude 
that there should also be a symmetrical 
“hard problem of matter” – that is, that we 
should not, even in principle, be able to ex-
plain matter in terms of mind. The natural 
next step in this flawed line of reasoning is 
to look for more fundamental ontological 
ground preceding both mind and matter; 
a third substrate to which matter and mind 
could both be reduced.
« 13 » A good example of this line of 
reasoning is brought by ontic pancompu-
tationalism, which posits that ungrounded 
information processing is what makes up 
the universe at its most fundamental level 
(Fredkin 2003). As such, ontic pancomputa-
tionalism entails that computation precedes 
matter ontologically. But “if computations 
are not configurations of physical entities, 
the most obvious alternative is that compu-
tations are abstract, mathematical entities, 
like numbers and sets” (Piccinini 2015). Ac-
cording to ontic pancomputationalism, even 
mind itself – psyche, soul – is a derivative 
phenomenon of purely abstract information 
processing.2
« 14 » To gain a sense of the epistemic 
cost of this line of reasoning, consider the 
position of physicist Max Tegmark (2014). 
According to him, “protons, atoms, mole-
cules, cells and stars” are all redundant “bag-
gage” (ibid: 255). Only the mathematical 
parameters used to describe the behaviour 
of matter are real. In other words, Tegmark 
posits that the universe consists purely of 
numbers – ungrounded information – but 
nothing to attach these numbers to. The uni-
verse supposedly is a “set of abstract entities 
with relations between them,” which “can be 
described in a baggage-independent way” 
(ibid: 267). He attributes all ontological val-
ue to a description while – paradoxically – 
denying the existence of the very thing that 
is described in the first place.
« 15 » Clearly, ontic pancomputational-
ism represents total commitment to abstract 
mathematical concepts as the foundation 
of existence. According to it, there are only 
numbers and sets. But what are numbers and 
sets without the mind or matter where they 
could reside? It is one thing to state in lan-
2 | See Fredkin’s online draft paper titled “On 
the Soul” at http://www.digitalphilosophy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/on_the_soul.pdf
guage that numbers and sets can exist with-
out mind and matter, but it is another thing 
entirely to explicitly and coherently conceive 
of what – if anything – this may mean. By 
way of analogy, it is possible to write – as 
Lewis Carrol did – that the Cheshire Cat’s 
grin remains after the cat disappears, but it is 
another thing entirely to conceive explicitly 
and coherently of what this means.
« 16 » Ontic pancomputationalism ap-
peals to ungrounded information – pure 
numbers, mathematical descriptions – as 
ontological primitive, i.e., as the sole funda-
mental aspect of existence. But what exactly 
is information? Our intuitive understand-
ing of the concept has been cogently cap-
tured and made explicit by Claude Shannon 
(1948): information is given by state differ-
ences discernible in a system. As such, it is 
a property of a system – associated with the 
system’s possible configurations – not an 
entity or ontological class unto itself. under 
mainstream physicalism – that is, materi-
alism – the system whose configurations 
constitute information is a material arrange-
ment, such as a computer. under idealism, it 
is mind, for experience entails different phe-
nomenal states that can be qualitatively dis-
cerned from one another. Hence, informa-
tion requires a mental or material substrate 
in order to be even conceived of explicitly 
and coherently. To say that information ex-
ists in and of itself is akin to speaking of spin 
without the top, of ripples without water, of a 
dance without the dancer, or of the Cheshire 
Cat’s grin without the cat. It is a grammati-
cally valid statement devoid of any semantic 
value: a language game less meaningful than 
fantasy, for internally consistent fantasy can 
at least be explicitly and coherently con-
ceived of and, thereby, known as such. But 
in what way can we know information un-
couched in mind or matter?
« 17 » One assumes that serious propo-
nents of ontic pancomputationalism are well 
aware of this line of criticism. How do they 
then reconcile their position with it? A pas-
sage by Luciano Floridi – well-known advo-
cate of information as ontological primitive 
– may provide a clue. In a section titled “The 
nature of information,” he states:
“ Information is notoriously a polymorphic 
phenomenon and a polysemantic concept so, as 
an explicandum, it can be associated with several 
explanations, depending on the level of abstrac-
tion adopted and the cluster of requirements and 
desiderata orientating a theory. […] Information 
remains an elusive concept.” (Floridi 2008: 117, 
emphasis added)
« 18 » Such ambiguity lends ontic pan-
computationalism a kind of conceptual flu-
idity that renders it impossible to pin down. 
After all, if the choice of ontological primi-
tive is given by “an elusive concept,” how 
can one definitely establish that the choice 
is wrong? In admitting the possibility that 
information may be “a network of logically 
interdependent but mutually irreducible 
concepts” (Floridi 2008: 120), Floridi seems 
to suggest, even, that such elusiveness may 
be unresolvable.
« 19 » While vagueness may be defensi-
ble in regard to natural entities conceivably 
beyond the human ability to apprehend, it 
is at least difficult to justify when it comes 
to a human concept such as information. We 
invented the concept, so we either specify 
clearly what we mean by it or our conceptu-
alization remains too ambiguous to be onto-
logically meaningful. In the latter case, there 
is literally no sense in attributing ontological 
value to information and, hence, ontic pan-
computationalism is – once again – strictly 
meaningless.
« 20 » Although ontic pancomputation-
alism is an admittedly extreme example, 
an analogous attempt to reduce concrete-
ness – that is, the felt presence of conscious 
perception (Merleau-Ponty 1964) – to mere 
explanatory abstraction lies behind both 
mainstream physicalism and the alleged 
mind-matter dichotomy, as I shall argue in 
the next section. At the root of this concern-
ing state of affairs is a generalized failure 
to recognize that every step of explanatory 
abstraction away from the concreteness of 
conscious perception implies a reduction in 
epistemic confidence: we do not know that 
abstract conceptual objects exist with the 
same level of confidence that we do know 
that our perceptions – whatever their source 
or underlying ontic nature may be – exist. I 
do not know that subatomic particles out-
side and independent of mind exist with 
the same level of confidence that I do know 
that the chair I am sitting on, which I am 
directly acquainted with through conscious 
perception, exists. Worse still, with what 
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confidence can we know that a loosely de-
fined, possibly incoherent concept such as 
ungrounded information lies at the founda-
tion of existence? As such, steps of explana-
tory abstraction can only be justified if the 
relevant empirical observations cannot be 
explained without them, lest we conflate sci-
ence and philosophy with meaningless lan-
guage games. This is an important claim, so 
allow me to dwell on it a little longer before 
proceeding to the next section.
« 21 » It could be argued that the exis-
tence of perceptual illusions indicates that 
conscious perception entails less epistemic 
confidence than abstract formal systems. 
For instance, in the well-known “checker 
shadow” illusion created by the Perceptual 
Science Group of the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, two identically coloured 
squares – A and B – of a checkerboard are 
initially perceived to be of opposite colours 
because of the different contexts in which 
they are perceived (see Figure  1). Should 
we then declare that conscious perception is 
fundamentally unreliable? Well, notice that 
it is also conscious perception that eventually 
dispels the illusion: by looking at one of the 
squares as it is moved to the other’s context, 
one sees that it indeed has the same colour 
as the other square. So even in the case of 
perceptual illusions, it is still direct, concrete 
experience that provides us with the epis-
temic confidence necessary to recognize the 
illusion for what it is.
« 22 » Further supporting the claim that 
abstracting away from direct experience im-
plies a reduction in epistemic confidence is 
the anti-realist view in philosophy of science. 
According to it, abstract theoretical entities 
– such as subatomic particles, invisible fields 
and any other postulated entity that escapes 
our ability to directly perceive – are but “con-
venient fictions, designed to help predict the 
behaviour of things in the observable world” 
(Okasha 2002: 61; see also van Fraassen 
1990). In other words, the best we can say 
about subatomic particles and other abstract 
entities is that the observable world behaves 
as if these abstract entities existed. This does 
not entail or imply that the entities exist as 
such, which we cannot be certain of either 
way (van Fraassen 1980). In this sense, ex-
planatory abstraction again implies reduc-
tion in epistemic confidence, insofar as we 
do not know that subatomic particles and 
invisible fields exist with the same level of 
confidence that we do know that the world 
we consciously perceive exists.
levels of explanatory 
abstraction
« 23 » Like ontic pancomputationalism, 
mainstream physicalism is no stranger to 
the epistemic cost of explanatory abstrac-
tion: the existence of a material world out-
side and independent of mind is a theoreti-
cal inference arising from interpretation of 
sense perceptions within a framework of 
complex thought, not an empirical obser-
vation. After all, what we call the world is 
available to us solely as “images” – defined 
here broadly, so as to include any sensory 
modality – on the screen of perception, 
which is itself mental. Even physicist An-
drei Linde, one of the founders of the theory 
of cosmic inflation, acknowledged this in a 
1998 talk titled “universe, Life, Conscious-
ness,” delivered at the Center for Theology 
and the Natural Sciences (CTNS), Berkeley, 
California:3
“ Let us remember that our knowledge of the 
world begins not with matter but with percep-
tions. I know for sure that my pain exists, my 
‘green’ exists, and my ‘sweet’ exists […] every-
thing else is a theory. Later we find out that our 
perceptions obey some laws, which can be most 
conveniently formulated if we assume that there 
is some underlying reality beyond our percep-
tions. This model of material world obeying laws 
of physics is so successful that soon we forget 
about our starting point and say that matter is 
the only reality, and perceptions are only helpful 
for its description.”
« 24 » Now, we know that mind is capa-
ble of autonomously generating the imagery 
we associate with matter: dreams and hallu-
cinations, for instance, are often qualitative-
ly indistinguishable from the so-called “real 
world.” Therefore, the motivation for postu-
lating an objective material world must go 
beyond the mere existence of this imagery. 
And indeed, what the notion of objective 
matter attempts to make sense of are certain 
patterns and regularities observable in the 
imagery, such as:
  The correlations between observed brain 
activity and reported inner life (see, e.g., 
Koch 2004 for a scientific take on the 
3 | The transcript of this talk is available at 
http://web.stanford.edu/~alinde/SpirQuest.doc
Figure 1: The “checker shadow” illusion. Despite appearances to the contrary, squares A and B 
are the same shade of grey.
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neural correlates of consciousness, but 
consider also the obvious effects of e.g., 
alcohol consumption and head trauma 
– both of which disrupt regular brain 
activity – on inner experience);
  The observation that we all seem to in-
habit the same world; and
  The observation that the dynamics of 
this world unfold independently of our 
personal volition.
« 25 » After all, if mind is not a prod-
uct of objective arrangements of matter, 
how can there be such tight correlations 
between brain activity and experience? If 
the world is not made of matter outside our 
individual minds, how can we all share the 
same world beyond ourselves? If the world 
is not independent of mind, why can we not 
change the laws of nature simply by imag-
ining them to be different? Clearly, thus, 
the non-mental world posited by physical-
ism is largely an attempt to make sense of 
these three basic observations. As such, it 
is an explanatory abstraction, not itself an 
observation. We conceptually imagine that 
there is a non-mental world underlying our 
perceptions – and in some sense isomor-
phic to these perceptions – because doing 
so helps explain the basic observations (see 
Figure 2). Nonetheless, whatever ontologi-
cal class is pointed to by this conceptual 
abstraction remains perforce epistemically 
inaccessible, a recognition already present 
in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Rea-
son.
« 26 » Explanatory abstraction does 
not stop at this first level. After imagin-
ing a non-mental world isomorphic to our 
perceptions, we are left with the task of ex-
plaining how and why this world behaves 
the way it does. Why do objects fall when 
dropped? Why does a piece of amber at-
tract chaff when rubbed? How can certain 
metals magnetically attract other metals? 
To answer these questions, we must attri-
bute to the material world certain prop-
erties that go beyond perceptual isomor-
phism. We say, for instance, that matter 
has the properties of mass, charge and spin. 
These properties constitute a second-level 
of explanatory abstraction beyond direct 
experience (see Figure 2 again).
« 27 » Naturally, there can be even 
more levels of explanatory abstraction in-
volved. Superstring theory, for instance, at-
tempts to explain the properties of matter 
through the particular modes of vibration 
of imagined hyper-dimensional strings 
(Greene 2003). But the two levels illustrat-
ed in Figure 2 are sufficient for the discus-
sion that follows.
« 28 » The defining characteristic of 
explanation by abstraction is a progressive 
movement away from Edmund Husserl’s 
(1970) “life-world,” from the concreteness 
of direct experience. First, one posits a 
world devoid of qualities (varela, Thomp-
son & Rosch 1993) and, as such, devoid of 
concreteness too, for concreteness is a qual-
ity of experience. Then, one progressively 
loads this world with properties that entail 
no direct isomorphism to experience. For 
instance, we do not see electric charge or 
spin; we only see the behaviour of matter 
that these abstract properties supposedly 
explain, such as attraction and repulsion. 
Similarly, we do not feel mass; we only feel 
the weight and inertia of objects, which the 
property of having mass supposedly ex-
plains (Okasha 2002: 58–76).
« 29 » Because concreteness is the in-
tuitive foundation of what we consider 
real, each step in this movement away from 
concreteness takes us farther from what 
we intuitively sense to be real (Merleau-
Ponty 1964). One may then become lost in 
a forest of intellectually appealing but ul-
timately arbitrary conceptualizations. This, 
again, is the epistemic cost of explanation 
by abstraction.
Dispelling the mind-matter 
dichotomy
« 30 » By definition, the two mem-
bers of a dichotomy are jointly exhaustive 
and mutually exclusive. Ontologically, this 
means that if one member is the case, then 
the other is necessarily not the case, and 
vice-versa. For instance, in the context of 
biological organisms, if life is not the case, 
then death is necessarily the case. In the 
context of a job application, if success is the 
case (i.e., the applicant gets the job), then 
failure is not the case. And so on. As such, 
a single test suffices to acquire knowledge 
about the ontological status of both mem-
bers of a dichotomy. If I can perform a test 
to determine if a person is alive, then I will 
automatically know whether the person is 
dead, without having to test for death sepa-
rately. If I can set a criterion for success, 
then that same criterion will automatically 
determine whether failure is the case, with-
out my having to set a separate criterion for 
failure. And so on. I shall call this property 
of a dichotomy epistemic symmetry. When 
two concepts are epistemically symmetri-
cal, knowledge of one implies knowledge 
of the other.
« 31 » Now notice that epistemic sym-
metry can only hold for concepts residing in 
the same level of explanatory abstraction. If 
they do not, then there necessarily is at least 
one extra inferential step necessary to know 
whether one of the concepts obtains. This 
breaks the symmetry, for then we cannot ac-
Explains basic observations
on the screen of perception
Explains behavior
of the material world
First level of abstraction
(perceptual isomorphism)
Second level of abstraction
(extra properties attributed)
Mind Material
world
Properties of
the material 
world
Figure 2 • Levels of explanatory abstraction. Grey and dotted parts represent steps of abstraction.
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quire knowledge of the ontological status of 
both concepts with a single test.
« 32 » Here is an example: the presence 
of a negative feeling can be tested for directly 
through introspection – thus entailing no in-
ferential steps – whereas testing for the pres-
ence of a positive electric charge requires an 
inference by observation of the associated 
behaviour of matter. Because of this need for 
an extra inferential step, knowing the nega-
tive feeling cannot imply knowledge of the 
positive electric charge. The negative feel-
ing and the positive electric charge are not, 
therefore, epistemically symmetrical and 
cannot constitute a dichotomy.
« 33 » Conversely, positive and negative 
electric charges are both properties of matter, 
residing in the second level of explanatory 
abstraction illustrated in Figure 2. As such, 
they are epistemically symmetrical and can 
constitute a dichotomy. Indeed, every level of 
explanatory abstraction can encompass di-
chotomies. For instance, the size of material 
objects is isomorphic to perceptual qualities: 
we can subjectively test whether an object is 
big or small in relation to another object. As 
such, bigness and smallness both reside in 
the first level of explanatory abstraction and 
are epistemically symmetrical; they can con-
stitute a dichotomy (see Figure 3).
« 34 » But – and here is the key point – 
mind and matter do not reside in the same 
level of explanatory abstraction. Mind – as 
defined in the Introduction – is the ground 
within which, and out of which, abstractions 
are made. Matter, in turn, is an abstraction 
of mind (see Figure  2 again). This breaks 
the epistemic symmetry between them: we 
do not know matter in the same way that 
we know mind, for – as cogently argued 
by Linde in the earlier quote – matter is an 
inference and mind a given. Consequently, 
although mind can encompass polar oppo-
sites – such as the feelings of love and fear 
in the context of a situation where someone 
feels passionate about a particular aspect of 
someone else (assuming that other passions, 
such as hate, which is arguably a form of 
fear, are particular instances of love or fear) 
– it cannot itself be the polar opposite of 
matter or matter’s properties. It follows that 
we have no reason to conclude that reduc-
ing matter to mind is as challenging as re-
ducing mind to matter, and there is thus no 
substantiation for a “hard problem of mind.” 
Stronger still, insofar as what we call “mat-
ter” can be parsimoniously construed as 
phenomenal patterns of excitation of mind, 
matter is on an epistemic par with mind and 
can, in principle, be reduced to the latter, for 
both already reside in the same ontological 
domain. This move takes mind itself to be 
an ontological primitive and eliminates any 
conceivable “hard problem of mind,” since 
mind now does not need to be reduced.
« 35 » The notion of a dichotomy be-
tween mind and matter arises from lan-
guage. In order to speak of the substrate of 
experience we must give it a name, such as 
“mind” or “consciousness,” thereby linguis-
tically objectifying the subject. Then, we 
conflate language with what language at-
tempts to describe, implicitly assuming that 
mind is an object just as matter allegedly is. 
We forget that there is no epistemic symme-
try between the two.
« 36 » Indeed, because the concept of 
mind-independent matter, as an explana-
tory abstraction, arises in mind, as an “exci-
tation” of mind, to say that mind and matter 
constitute a dichotomy is akin to saying that 
ripples and water constitute a dichotomy. 
Dichotomies can exist only between differ-
ent kinds of ripples – say, those that flow 
mostly to the right versus those that flow 
mostly to the left – not between ripples and 
the substrate where they ripple. Mind is the 
substrate of the explanatory abstraction we 
call matter, so when we speak of a mind-
matter dichotomy we fall into a fundamen-
tal “category mistake,” as Ryle (2009) put it. 
However, contrary to what Ryle suggests, it is 
matter that is the abstraction, not mind.
« 37 » The notion that idealism and 
mainstream physicalism are mirror images 
of each other arises from a failure to grasp 
this point. Lucid contemplation of these on-
tologies shows that idealism attempts to re-
duce an explanatory abstraction (physically 
objective matter) to that which articulates 
and hosts the abstraction in the first place 
(mind). This is prima facie eminently rea-
sonable. Mainstream physicalism, in turn, 
attempts to reduce mind to mind’s own ex-
planatory abstractions, an obvious paradox 
that constitutes the crux of the “hard prob-
lem.”
« 38 » There would be no “hard prob-
lem” if one did not conflate explanatory ab-
stractions with concrete ontological primi-
tives, if one did not attempt to paradoxically 
reduce mind to abstractions of mind. The 
“hard problem” is not something empiri-
cally observed but the salient result of in-
ternal contradictions in a logico-conceptual 
schema; contradictions that I hope to have 
helped make explicit with the present article.
« 39 » Naturally, circumventing the 
“hard problem” in the way suggested above 
ultimately forces us to make do with mind 
alone as an ontological primitive and there-
by entertain some form of idealism—more 
specifically, a form of idealism wherein 
mind is the experientially given ground of 
existence, whose manifestations comprise 
the concrete phenomenality you and I un-
dergo in everyday life. And whereas ideal-
ism in the West has had its heyday in the 
eighteenth (e.g., Berkeley) and early nine-
teenth (e.g., Hegel) centuries, it is now en-
joying renewed interest (Chalmers 2018) for 
Mind Materialworld
Properties of the 
material world
Love
vs.
Fear
Big
vs.
Small
Positive
charge
vs.
Negative
charge
Figure 3 • Dichotomies in their respective levels of explanatory abstraction.
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having been updated and revitalized with 
compelling new formulations (e.g., Kastrup 
2017a, 2017b; Yetter-Chappell 2018; as well 
as Fields et al. 2017, insofar as the latter can 
be construed as a form of idealism). These 
are sometimes proposed under new names, 
such as “cosmopsychism” (e.g., Shani 2015; 
Nagasawa & Wager 2016), which, as the 
name suggests, posits that the cosmos as 
a whole is essentially phenomenal. Even 
“radical constructivism” can be construed as 
a form of idealism, insofar as its claims are 
not merely epistemic, but ontic:
“ Radical constructivism […] develops a theory 
of knowledge in which knowledge does not reflect 
an ‘objective’ ontological reality, but exclusively an 
ordering and organization of a world constituted 
by our experience.” (Glasersfeld 1984: 24, em-
phasis added)
Finally, the strongest objections usually lev-
eraged against idealism have recently also 
been tackled (Kastrup 2017d).
« 40 » Having said all this, it should be 
noted that, in and of itself, the argument pro-
vided in this article, despite being support-
ive of idealism, does not necessarily imply 
idealism. I have focused on epistemic cost 
considerations and did not show whether 
or how idealism can account for all relevant 
empirical observations we make of nature. 
Indeed, an articulation of an idealist ontolo-
gy is not within the scope of this article. But 
if it is demonstrated – as some of the papers 
cited above claim to do – that idealism can 
account for all empirical observations that 
mainstream physicalism allegedly accounts 
for, then epistemic cost considerations cer-
tainly tilt the balance in favour of idealism, 
due to the latter’s lack of reliance on infla-
tionary, epistemically unreliable, paradoxi-
cal abstractions. As such, the core claim 
of this essay is not so much the validity of 
idealism as that physically objective matter 
is a doubtful cognitive construct, in the strict 
constructivist sense: insofar as we believe to 
see matter outside and independent of mind 
when we look at the world around ourselves, 
we are conflating a rational-linguistic con-
struction with what is empirically observed.
Conclusion
« 41 » The pervasive but unexamined 
assumption that mind and matter consti-
tute a dichotomy is an error arising from 
language artifacts. Members of dichotomies 
must be epistemically symmetrical and, 
therefore, reside in the same level of abstrac-
tion. Physically objective matter – as an ex-
planatory model – is an abstraction of mind. 
We do not know matter in the same way that 
we know mind, for matter is an inference 
and mind a given. This breaks the epistemic 
symmetry between the two and implies that 
mainstream physicalism and idealism can-
not be mirror images of each other.
« 42 » Failure to recognize that different 
levels of epistemic confidence are intrinsic 
to different levels of explanatory abstraction 
lies at the root not only of the false mind-
matter dichotomy, but also of attempts to 
make sense of the world through increas-
ingly ungrounded explanatory abstractions. 
Lest we conflate science and philosophy with 
hollow language games, we must never lose 
sight of the difference between an abstract 
inference and a direct observation. Keeping 
this distinction in mind allows us to con-
struct useful predictive models of nature’s 
behaviour – which ultimately is what sci-
ence is meant to do – without restrictive and 
ultimately fallacious inferences about what 
nature is. This, in turn, liberates us from 
thought artifacts such as the “hard problem 
of consciousness” and opens up whole new 
avenues for making sense of self and world.
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> upshot • Kastrup’s attempt to un-
dermine the dichotomy between mind 
and matter is interesting but it leaves 
much to be desired. In particular, it suf-
fers from the following three difficul-
ties. First, it is predicated on a misguided 
working definition of dichotomy. Sec-
ond, it conflates the concept of matter 
with the putative denotation of that 
concept. Lastly, it effectively presupposes 
the refutation of materialism, making 
it pointless to argue (as he does) that 
materialism is epistemically more costly 
than idealism.
« 1 » In this ambitious target article 
Bernardo Kastrup attempts to undermine 
the dichotomy between mind and mat-
ter and, correspondingly, between ideal-
ism and materialism. More specifically, his 
argument is meant to establish two major 
points. First, that idealism and material-
ism are not, epistemically speaking, on par 
since the latter, but not the former, necessi-
tates abstractions that transcend all possible 
experience. Second, and consequently, that 
while materialism is burdened with a hard 
problem of consciousness there is no analo-
gous “hard problem of matter” to encumber 
idealism. ultimately, his conclusion is that 
reductive materialism is epistemically more 
costly than reductive idealism, making it 
the lesser alternative of the two.
« 2 » The thrust of Kastrup’s argument 
reflects a familiar line of reasoning within 
metaphysical idealism – beginning with 
Berkeley and reaching its apex in Post-Kan-
tian idealism – which strives to derive ontic 
conclusions from epistemic considerations. 
Much ink, both critical and supportive, was 
spent on debating the strengths and weak-
nesses of such epistemic arguments in favor 
of idealism (see, e.g., Ewing 1934: chap. II), 
and it is unfortunate that Kastrup shows 
little awareness of this relevant history. 
More regrettable, however, is the worry that 
although Kastrup is exploring a fascinat-
ing terrain, and although there is definitely 
something to be said in favor of linking 
the abstractions involved in the concept of 
matter to the difficulties facing material-
ism (a theme that was explored in detail by 
eminent philosophers such as Bergson and 
Whitehead), the logic of his argument is 
rife with lacunae. In what follows I focus on 
what I take to be the most serious of these. 
But first, a few more words about the gist of 
Kastrup’s argument.
« 3 » At the heart of Kastrup’s target 
article are the following two claims. First, 
that mind and matter are epistemically non-
symmetrical and therefore that they do not 
constitute a dichotomous pair. Second, that 
mind is the concrete ground for the abstrac-
tion identified as “matter.” In an important 
sense the second claim is the more basic of 
the two since it is this alleged non-symmet-
rical dependence of matter on the abstract-
ing activities of mind that enables Kastrup 
to undermine the presumed dichotomy 
between mind and matter. He then goes on 
to argue that in the absence of such a di-
chotomy one cannot conclude that idealism 
suffers from a “hard problem of matter” par-
allel to the hard problem of consciousness 
afflicting orthodox materialism. Moreover, 
using the crucial assumption that matter is 
ultimately an abstraction of mind, Kastrup 
proceeds to argue that while mind cannot be 
reduced to matter (as per the hard problem 
of consciousness), matter is, in principle, 
reducible to mind. This brings him to the 
conclusion that materialism is epistemically 
more costly than idealism, tilting the bal-
ance in favor of the latter.
« 4 » Ironically, the most formidable 
difficulty in Kastrup’s argument is a well-
known problem in the history of philoso-
phy, one which had had a devastating ef-
fect on the fate of idealism in 20th century 
philosophy. As mentioned, Kastrup’s entire 
argument is founded upon the assertion 
that matter is an abstraction of mind. The 
justification for this controversial claim is 
based on the assumption that we arrive at 
the concept of an experience-transcending 
matter as a result of the abstracting faculties 
of consciousness. However, the obvious re-
sponse to this type of argument is to insist 
that while the concept of matter is contingent 
upon the constructive activities of mind, in 
no way does this prove that the denotation of 
the concept – namely, matter itself, should 
it exist – is thereby contingent upon such 
acts. It seems a logical fallacy to conclude 
that matter itself is mind-dependent simply 
because such is the predicament of the con-
cept of matter. This was the main point of 
a highly influential critique of idealism (in 
particular Berkeley’s) due to George Edward 
Moore (1903) and Bertrand Russell (1974) 
and it is bewildering that Kastrup appears 
oblivious to the challenge.
« 5 » For this reason, nor is the analogy 
between the mind-matter relation and the 
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manner in which water relates to ripples on 
its surface an adequate one. For while rip-
ples are patterns of, or constructions within, 
a water mass one cannot conclude that mat-
ter is a pattern of mind merely because such 
is the status of the concept of matter (or per-
haps more precisely, of the process whereby 
such a concept is formed). To be clear, this is 
not an argument against the idea that matter 
might ultimately be an excitation of (some 
kind of) mind; rather, it simply goes to show 
that Kastrup’s argument falls short of estab-
lishing the point. As a result, the argument 
also fails to show that there is a category 
mistake in supposing that mind and matter 
are dichotomous (more on this below).
« 6 » Worse still, because Kastrup’s rea-
soning rests on the assumption that matter 
is nothing but an abstraction of mind, much 
of the rest of his argument is rendered obso-
lete. For if matter is ontologically grounded 
in mind then this constitutes a refutation 
of materialism (at any rate, of the material-
ism targeted by Kastrup), thereby making it 
pointless to proceed to argue that material-
ism is epistemically more costly than ideal-
ism. Evidently, it makes no sense to compare 
the cost of two rival positions if one of them 
is already presumed null and void.
« 7 » Returning now to the question of 
whether mind and matter (and consequent-
ly idealism and materialism) constitute a di-
chotomy, it should be pointed out that here, 
too, there are serious flaws in the argument. 
To begin with, even if Kastrup’s conceptual 
analysis of dichotomy is taken for granted, 
his argument succeeds only in proving that 
there is an asymmetry between the cognitive 
processes responsible for our confidence in 
the metaphysical reality of mind and those 
responsible for our belief in the objective 
existence of matter: mind being a given, 
whereas the putative existence of matter is 
inferred. While this asymmetry of knowl-
edge justification has been a staple of mod-
ern philosophy ever since Descartes, it does 
little to show that the metaphysical dichot-
omy between mind and matter is unsound 
(clearly, Descartes himself did not think that 
there was any inconsistency on his part in 
endorsing both of these tenets and in mak-
ing them pillars of his system).
« 8 » But Kastrup’s analysis of dichot-
omy is highly tendentious. The problem 
consists in his claim that the members of a 
dichotomous pair <x, y> are mutually ex-
clusive and jointly exhaustive. For whereas 
mutual exclusiveness is undeniable the 
condition of joint exhaustiveness is un-
tenable. Clearly, while some dichotomies 
are exhaustive, e.g., <dead, live> or <odd, 
even>, many others are not. “Black” and 
“white,” for example, or “young” and “old,” 
or “beautiful” and “ugly,” are dichotomous 
terms not because there are no other logical 
options around but because they constitute 
polar opposites, namely, ostensible ends of a 
spectrum of differences. In particular, many 
philosophical dichotomies are emphatically 
non-exhaustive. To mention but one notable 
example, realism and nominalism form a 
dichotomous pair with respect to the prob-
lem of universals, but they are not jointly 
exhaustive: one could be an agnostic (pro-
fessing no knowledge as to whether there 
are universals), or a nihilist (who holds that 
nothing exists), or a trope theorist (denying 
universals but affirming the existence of ab-
stract particulars).
« 9 » The <idealism, materialism> di-
chotomy constitutes a similar case. The pair 
is dichotomous not because it exhausts the 
conceptual terrain (other options include 
dualism, neutral monism, double aspect 
theory, etc.) but because its members are, 
in a relevant sense, hyper-contrastive. Like-
wise, the pair <mind, matter> is dichoto-
mous in spite of there being other options 
possible (e.g., a neutral substance, or an 
ontology consisting of wholly abstract enti-
ties). Yet, if the members of a dichotomous 
pair need not be, and often are not, jointly 
exhaustive, then Kastrup’s single yes-or-no 
test – his criterion for a bona fide dichotomy 
– is untenable: one cannot infer ugly from 
non-beautiful, matter from non-mind, ide-
alism from non-materialism, and so on. 
And since this criterion is crucial for his 
definition of epistemic symmetry, which, in 
turn, is decisive for the rest of the argument, 
the entire edifice suffers.
« 10 » Nor is Kastrup entitled to con-
clude that the presumed dichotomy between 
mind and matter is the only reason to con-
sider the reduction of matter to mind to be 
as challenging as the reduction of mind to 
matter. Many thinkers are deeply skepti-
cal regarding the ability of a strictly idealist 
metaphysics to account for certain cardinal 
features of physical reality such as causation 
or the nature of space. They may be wrong 
(I lean in the same direction as Kastrup on 
this point) but such conviction is surely a 
reason to believe in a so-called hard prob-
lem of matter.
« 11 » Finally, equally questionable is 
Kastrup’s swiping contention that steps of 
explanatory abstraction can only be justi-
fied if the relevant empirical observations 
cannot be explained otherwise. While I 
sympathize with Kastrup’s respect for con-
crete experience as the ground of all knowl-
edge, he seems to ignore the notion that the 
simplicity of a theory is measured not only 
by the number of types of basic entities it 
postulates but also by the efficiency with 
which it derives the existence of non-basic 
entities. Often there is a trade-off between 
these two methodological virtues. In formal 
systems, for example, one can choose be-
tween relying on axioms or on added rules 
of inference: the fewer rules there are, the 
simpler the system’s base, but the derivation 
of theorems becomes more complicated. 
And while in formal systems the choice 
between these two competing dimensions 
of simplicity is merely pragmatic, when it 
comes to scientific and philosophical is-
sues it can give rise to legitimate theoretical 
disagreements. Suppose, as some Millian 
phenomenalists argue (see Pelczar 2015), 
that it is possible, in principle, to reduce 
all of reality to human-level experience. 
Does this undermine the status of related 
metaphysical positions such as panpsy-
chism, or cosmic idealism, whose articula-
tion necessitates the irreducibility of other 
types of experiencing beings? The answer, 
of course, is “not necessarily,” since what 
such phenomenalism may gain by avoiding 
certain abstractions might nevertheless be 
outweighed by the convoluted manner in 
which it strives to derive the familiar world 
around us. Analogously, the mere possibil-
ity of one’s being able to construct an ontol-
ogy free of the theoretical abstraction of an 
experience-independent matter does not, in 
itself, disprove materialism: the alternatives 
must be measured with respect to various 
dimensions of simplicity, plausibility, and 
overall explanatory power. The upshot, 
then, is that considerations of explanatory 
power are more complicated than Kastrup 
imagines, and that they may legitimate 
theoretical abstractions even if the latter 
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are not absolutely necessary from a strictly 
logical point of view.
« 12 » In conclusion, Kastrup deserves 
some praise for braving the attempt to re-
vive the tradition of deriving metaphysical 
idealism from epistemological idealism. As 
I understand it, the constructivist approach 
in science and philosophy is committed to 
epistemological idealism, namely, to the view 
that our knowledge of mind-independent 
reality is suffused with the constructive ac-
tivities of our own minds and, therefore, that 
all knowledge involves self-knowledge (see 
Guyer & Horstmann 2018). However, more 
often than not, constructivists are reluctant 
to take an explicit extra step in the direction 
of metaphysical idealism, viz. the contention 
that mind, or consciousness, constitutes 
the ultimate make-up of existence. If Kas-
trup’s argument is sound, it follows that the 
only form of metaphysical realism (broadly 
conceived as the doctrine that there exists 
an external reality independent of human 
observers) consistent with epistemological 
idealism is metaphysical idealism. As such, 
the conclusion is of relevance to construc-
tivists insofar as it shows that metaphysical 
idealism is the only form of metaphysical 
realism compatible with the constructivist 
approach.1 unfortunately, better arguments 
are needed in order to substantiate the infer-
ence from epistemological to metaphysical 
idealism.
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may still prefer not to engage with any form of 
metaphysics. I thank the journal’s editor for help-
ing me clarify this point as well as the entire last 
paragraph of the commentary.
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> upshot • While instantaneous phe-
nomenal consciousness may be (and I 
would argue should be) regarded as fun-
damental, as soon as consciousness is 
extended in time and memory is invoked, 
the resulting notion of “mind” is as ab-
stract as that of “matter.”
« 1 » Bernardo Kastrup mounts a con-
temporary version of an argument for on-
tological idealism familiar since Descartes: 
since matter can only be known via mind, 
it cannot be rational to attribute ontological 
primacy to matter. Mind, on the other hand, 
is known “directly.” Filling in the tacit prem-
ise that being known directly is at least a 
necessary condition for ontological primacy, 
the conclusion that mind is at least a better 
candidate for ontological primacy follows.
« 2 » The premise that “direct” knowl-
edge of X is necessary for, or even evidence 
for, X being ontologically primary can be 
questioned, and I will question it later. First, 
however, let us ask about mind and matter. 
Kastrup does not define “matter” beyond a 
few examples (e.g., tables and chairs in §1) 
and emphasizing that it is “physically objec-
tive” (§6). A traditional definition might be 
“that which occupies space and has mass.” 
“Matter” on this definition being ontologi-
cally primary is difficult to reconcile with 
contemporary physics, and what, if any-
thing, “physically objective” means has been 
unclear since the 1920s. The relevance of 
physics to attributions of ontological pri-
macy can, however, also be questioned. 
Kastrup clearly questions it; his intuition 
pump against “ontic pancomputationalism” 
is aimed squarely at those who would find 
nonlocality, acausality, superdeterminism 
or emergent spacetime outlandish. There 
are doubtless many philosophers, scientists 
and members of the general public who sub-
scribe to the far more intuitive notions that 
Kastrup comprehends under “mainstream 
physicalism,” and Kastrup’s point that the 
“matter” or “physical objects” to which they 
appeal are abstractions is difficult to argue 
with.
Is mind a “given”?
« 3 » Kastrup explicitly defines “mind” 
as “phenomenal consciousness” with the 
clarifications that “(mind) entails only the 
presence of phenomenal properties, in that 
it is defined as the substrate or ground of 
experience” (§9) and “experience can be co-
herently regarded as an excitation of mind” 
(§10). Kastrup’s argument for an epistemo-
logical asymmetry between mind and mat-
ter depends on “mind” so defined being not 
an abstraction, or at any rate significantly 
less of an abstraction than tables or chairs.
« 4 » Interestingly, Kastrup gives no 
explicit argument that either “phenomenal 
consciousness” or “the substrate or ground 
of experience” are not abstractions. He states 
that mind is “a given” (§34), pointing to an 
argument of Andrei Linde quoted in §23. 
Linde is not, however, talking about mind 
(as Kastrup defines it) in the quoted pas-
sage; he is talking about perception. Percep-
tions, Linde argues, are given; “everything 
else is a theory” (§23). The examples Linde 
lists – pain, green and sweet – are, however, 
not strictly speaking perceptions; they are 
rather raw qualia. Perceptions are complex 
experiences that join such raw qualia with 
other raw qualia of a distinct, “epistemic” 
class, those involved in “source monitor-
ing” (e.g., Griffin & Fletcher 2017), i.e., 
distinguishing perceptions from imagina-
tions, intuitions or memories, in assigning 
levels of what Kastrup calls “concreteness” 
(§9), assigning subjective probabilities given 
background knowledge, and so forth. Such 
epistemic qualia are subject to their own 
illusions, which can be recognized from a 
third-person perspective but not corrected 
from a first-person perspective; the “more 
real than real” experiences accompanying 
insular-cortex seizures are compelling ex-
amples (e.g., Picard 2013).
« 5 » The signal failure of materialist, 
physicalist, computational, or to date any 
other approaches to explain the presence 
of raw qualia in terms of anything else (e.g., 
Chalmers 1996; Dietrich 2015) makes it 
reasonable, at any rate, to take raw qualia as 
given. Raw qualia occur, and though much 
can be said about the correlates of their oc-
currence, their occurrence itself seems in-
explicable. But raw qualia are not mind for 
Kastrup, they are “excitations of mind.” They 
are, moreover, by their very nature instanta-
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neous and ever-changing. We all know what 
pain is, but separating a particular raw quale 
of pain – this pain – out from the flow of ex-
perience is difficult at best.
Experience and its “ground”
« 6 » Mind is, for Kastrup, both the 
“ground” of experience and “the ground 
within which, and out of which, abstrac-
tions are made” (§34). This “ground” is, cru-
cially, extended in time, “for experience en-
tails different phenomenal states that can be 
qualitatively discerned from one another” 
(§16). It must also be extended in capacity: 
it must be able to “hold” phenomenal states 
to be discerned from one another and their 
discerned differences, and phenomenal 
states to be abstracted and their recognized 
abstraction(s). To perform either of these 
operations, moreover, it must have inferen-
tial capabilities that act on experiences to 
generate other experiences, e.g., an experi-
enced difference between two phenomenal 
states, or the experienced conceptualization 
of an abstraction.
« 7 » What, however, is this “time” that 
allows different phenomenal states to be 
discerned? Once can “experience” time, e.g., 
while waiting for a traffic light, but what one 
is experiencing in such cases is itself a differ-
ence between phenomenal states (e.g., All-
man et al. 2014). Experiencing this differ-
ence requires memory, an ability to “hold” 
a phenomenal state – or an abstracted repre-
sentation of a phenomenal state – for some 
period of time so that it can be compared 
with a later phenomenal state. But what is 
“later”? Appealing to an external clock is ap-
pealing to an external system, and must be 
disallowed in the present context. From a 
phenomenal perspective, a “memory” is an 
experience that includes a particular epis-
temic quale, a “marker” that indicates that 
the rest of the experience happened in the 
“past,” perhaps accompanied by other qua-
lia indicating how “far” in the “past” it oc-
curred. The “past” or “external (clock) time” 
from this perspective are explanatory ab-
stractions, inferences from the experience of 
such markers.
« 8 » These notions of “markers” for 
“memory” or “duration” are, however, them-
selves abstractions. The idea that mind has 
the “capacity” to “hold” multiple experi-
ences – much less “representations” of expe-
riences – is an abstraction. “Inferential ca-
pabilities” are abstractions. “Excitation” and 
“ground” are abstractions; indeed, the latter 
in its present usage is a philosophical term 
of art understandable only as metaphor. 
These abstractions – the philosophical usage 
of “ground” aside – are the stock in trade of 
abstract, computational models of “mind” as 
a processor of the information contained in 
experiences (e.g., Fields et al. 2018).
« 9 » Kastrup suggests that abstractions 
such as these may be artifacts: “in order to 
speak of the substrate of experience we must 
give it a name, such as ‘mind’ or ‘conscious-
ness,’ thereby linguistically objectifying the 
subject” (§35). It is, however, the very notion 
of a substrate that is the key abstraction here. 
We are given raw qualia – instantaneous 
experiences. Among these is a sense of co-
herence. It is this coherence that we objec-
tify, thinking it to be observer-independent, 
meaningful, informative coherence. We seek 
to explain it, and postulate a “ground” with 
a set of abstract properties such as duration, 
capacity, inferential power and memory. 
These must be objective properties of mind 
if they are to bear any explanatory weight. 
Thus, we convince ourselves that we objec-
tively have minds, not just fleeting experi-
ences. This self-convincing seems automat-
ic; Philippe Rochat (2012) argues that it is 
innate.
The grin without the cat?
« 10 » Kastrup’s primary objection to 
ontic pancomputationalism is precisely that 
it rejects the abstraction of a “ground” for 
information: “To say that information exists 
in and of itself […] is a grammatically valid 
statement devoid of any semantic value” 
(§16). Hence an obvious question: Is any 
claim that instantaneous experiences are 
what is fundamentally given, and exist in 
and of themselves, similarly “devoid of any 
semantic value”? (Q1) For the claims seem 
entirely parallel. The slogan “information is 
physical” refers to information that has been 
recorded in a thermodynamically irreversi-
ble way (Landauer 1999); it refers to a mem-
ory that can be counted on to faithfully pre-
serve its content. That content is preserved 
is, however, inevitably just an assumption: 
that the content is experienced now is no 
guarantee that it was ever experienced pre-
viously, and indeed no guarantee that a past 
even exists. Memory and time are not given; 
they are explanatory abstractions.
« 11 » The idea that information itself is 
the fundamental given, at least among phys-
icists, has its origins with John Archibald 
Wheeler (1983: 195): “what we call ‘reality’ 
[…] consists of an elaborate papier-mâché 
construction of imagination and theory fit-
ted in between a few iron posts of observa-
tion.” But as Wheeler emphasizes, the “iron 
posts” are only iron, and indeed only posts, 
given another abstraction from experience: 
that there are other observers and that com-
munication between observers is possible. 
Other observers are, effectively, memories 
into which records of observations can be 
encoded and from which records of obser-
vations can be obtained. They are memo-
ries of a particular sort: a kind that can also 
make their own observations that may con-
firm or disconfirm your own.
« 12 » Kastrup also objects to the am-
biguity of the term “information,” claiming 
that as it is merely a “human concept,” its am-
biguity renders any claims for an ontological 
status of information “strictly meaningless” 
(§19). This is clearly question-begging, as 
any proponent of ontic information would 
claim that information is a “natural entity,” 
indeed the fundamental natural entity. But, 
again, the parallel between information and 
instantaneous experience is striking. The 
nature of instantaneous experience is hard 
to pin down, as 3,000 years of recorded 
philosophy attest. Hence the question: Is 
instantaneous experience itself a mere ab-
straction, a “human concept” for which any 
claim to ontological status is strictly mean-
ingless? (Q2)
Is ontology possible?
« 13 » All theories have ontologies, re-
lational networks (in some cases hierarchi-
cal) specifying what the theory is about. The 
“entities” represented may be events (e.g., 
observations) or processes; they need not be 
“things.” Such ontologies can be viewed as 
purely pragmatic.
« 14 » What is of concern here, however, 
is not the pragmatic ontology of some theo-
ry, not even that of quantum cosmology. It 
is fundamental ontology. But this concern 
rests on an assumption: that fundamental 
ontology is possible, that there are answers 
to the questions of whether mind derives 
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from matter, matter from mind, or both 
from something else. “Answer” here means 
an authoritative answer, an in-principle, 
objective, observer/theorist-independent, 
completely trustworthy answer. The ontolo-
gist’s quest is, as Kastrup puts it, for an an-
swer that “liberates us,” that allows “making 
sense of self and world” (§42).
« 15 » Perhaps, however, this is all a chi-
mera. Matter, mind, memory, spacetime, 
information, inferences, knowledge … all 
are abstractions. Once the cat has been de-
constructed, even the grin appears suspect.
« 16 » Perhaps, in other words, it is this 
quest for an authoritative answer that should 
be rejected. Perhaps self and world do not 
make sense, at least not in combination (Di-
etrich & Fields 2015). A dialetheic world – 
one in which some contradictions are true 
as well as false (Priest 1994) – permits limit-
ed and pragmatic theories, but disallows any 
universal and fundamental ontology.
Chris Fields is an independent scientist working on 
the physics, developmental biology and cognitive 
neuroscience of object perception and object re-
identification over time. His recent publications in 
quantum theory, endophysics, morphogenesis, cognitive 
modeling, and the etiology of autism spectrum disorders 
can be found at https://chrisfieldsresearch.com.
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Concepts, Intuitions, 
and hypotheses
Sebastian Kletzl
University of Vienna, Austria 
sebastian.kletzl/at/gmail.com
> upshot • In this comment I formulate 
two questions. The first concerns the role 
and nature of concepts and intuitions; 
the second is about the status of the “ex-
istence of objective matter” as a “hypoth-
esis” or “explanatory model.”
« 1 » Bernardo Kastrup’s ultimate goal is 
to show that – ontologically speaking – ide-
alism is more parsimonious than physical-
ism, since the latter involves more abstrac-
tions and less direct observation. As an 
example of the “epistemic cost of substitut-
ing explanatory abstractions for empirical 
observation” (§7) he alludes to ontic pan-
computationalism. According to this view, 
neither mind nor matter constitutes the fun-
damental bits of a mind-independent real-
ity but “ungrounded information.” Abstract 
mathematical entities and their relations are 
the basic building blocks of everything, not 
entities like atoms, molecules, qualia, or ex-
periences.
« 2 » Kastrup criticizes this view on the 
ground that he does not agree with the con-
cept of “information” employed by pancom-
putationalists. To support his claim he cites 
Luciano Floridi, who admits that “informa-
tion” may be an elusive concept. Against this, 
Kastrup appeals to another understanding 
of “information” which – as he assumes – 
expresses “[o]ur intuitive understanding of 
the concept” (§16, emphasis added) and he 
implies that the meaning of his understand-
ing is clear, i.e., without any vagueness or 
elusiveness. Since “information” is a concept 
invented by humans, it is either possible to 
clearly define what it means, or the concept 
is not ontologically meaningful at all.
« 3 » I want to seize on two conditions 
on which this claim rests: first, that concepts 
necessarily need to be clear and distinct in 
order to have an ontological meaning and, 
second, that the intuitiveness of a concept is 
a reason for or against employing it. First, it 
seems dubious to say that we must be able 
to clearly define what a concept means for it 
to be meaningful. Since, as Kastrup agrees, 
concepts are human concepts, we have only 
our human, finite set of experiences to de-
fine them. What follows from this observa-
tion, as Friedrich Waismann puts it, is that
“ we can never exclude altogether the possibility 
of some unforeseen situation arising in which we 
shall have to modify our definition. Try as we may, 
no concept is limited in such a way that there is 
no room for any doubt.” (Waismann 1945: 123)
This is why our concepts have what Wais-
mann called an “open texture.”1 Note that 
1 | Of course, this is the same idea as ex-
pressed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s “language 
games” but here I prefer Waismann’s way of put-
ting it since it is much more concise.
open texture is not simply vagueness. The 
point is not that we are not able to deter-
mine, say, large quantities because of our 
perceptual limitations. Rather, open texture 
is more fundamental and concerns all sorts 
of concepts: empirical, conventional and 
logical. In none of these contexts can we, 
even in principle, foresee all possible further 
uses of our concepts, so we can never clearly 
and unambiguously define them. Changes 
in our definitions are always possible, and 
sometimes they may even be very funda-
mental ones. An example is the use of “sub-
jective” and “objective” in the Middle Ages, 
which, back then, meant the exact opposite 
of our use of these terms today (Daston & 
Galison 2007: 29). Why should “informa-
tion” be immune to this possibility of chang-
ing its meaning? And does this make this 
concept ultimately meaningless?
« 4 » Our situation is not that either 
there is a clear definition available, or the 
concept is “ontologically meaningless.” Ever 
since the collapse of the project of creating 
an ideal language, philosophers have been 
amenable to accepting that our concepts – in 
philosophy, in science as well as in everyday 
life – are defined well enough for the given 
purposes; if not, we refine them by adding 
further requirements, or by altering or de-
leting older ones. The criterion for being de-
fined “well enough” is that the relevant peer 
group accepts the definition as sufficiently 
exact. More cannot be achieved since all our 
concepts are open textured. And they are 
open textured because we are finite beings 
who cannot foresee the future. If this impos-
sibility of providing clearly specified defini-
tions would make the concept of informa-
tion ontologically meaningless, then every 
concept is ontologically meaningless.
« 5 » This understanding of concepts 
and how they function links back to the 
second condition I find problematic in Kas-
trup’s line of thought. As I have presented 
my concern so far, Kastrup could reply by 
saying that the pancomputationalists’ con-
cept of information is wrong since it is coun-
terintuitive. Our intuitive understanding of 
“information” is expressed in saying that in-
formation is the state of a system, that is, de-
pendent on there being a system in the first 
place (§16). I will leave aside the question 
of how it is possible that intuitions – some-
thing like educated linguistic guesses – are 
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philosophically relevant at all; for the sake of 
argument, I assume that they are. But, and 
this is important, who is the relevant group 
alluded to in Kastrup’s formulation? It surely 
is not the intuition pancomputationalists 
entertain. Is it the intuition constructivists 
have, or philosophers other than pancom-
putationalists, or do laypeople entertain it 
too? To be a strong enough assumption in an 
argument, I guess it must mean something 
like “our common-sense understanding.”
« 6 » But the philosophical value of al-
luding to our common-sense understanding 
of “information” in his argument remains 
dubious. Does Kastrup think that his way 
of stating that, say, “the existence of objec-
tive matter is just a hypothesis” is intuitive 
to laypeople and philosophers alike? If he 
does, I beg to differ. The mind/matter di-
chotomy he is concerned with is not a dis-
tinction that plays a role in laypeople’s lives. 
It poses problems only for those few people 
who are trained in a certain philosophical 
tradition.2 And even if I am wrong about 
this point, insisting on a common-sense 
status quo expressed by the majority is very 
unlikely to give rise to conceptual change 
and philosophical invention. There are two 
reasons for this. The first is conceptual; to 
say that “I insist on the status quo” implies “I 
do not want things to change.” The second is 
historical; so far only very few philosophers 
have been impressed by any common-sense 
status quo. Since Kastrup’s argument is a 
prime example of philosophical invention 
and creativity, such insistence on the “intui-
tive status quo” cannot be in his interest.
« 7 » Let us not forget that the idea of the 
dichotomy between mind and matter, the 
very dichotomy Kastrup wants to dissolve, 
began to emerge with René Descartes and 
his conceptual work on the dualism between 
res cogitans and res extensa. Descartes’s de-
scription of this distinction was not intuitive 
to most of his contemporaries, and it needed 
much further conceptual work to arrive at 
the concepts of “mind” and “matter” we 
deem to be authorized and intuitive today. 
At the time of Descartes these concepts 
could not be clearly defined, otherwise the 
2 | I focus here on the skeptic-philosophical 
dichotomy rather than on, e.g., the dichotomy in 
a religious context that distinguishes “soul” and 
“lived body.”
philosophical work of modifying and alter-
ing them would have come to an end. Even 
though Descartes’s conceptualizations were 
not clear and distinct, I doubt that Kastrup 
would say that Descartes’s efforts were “too 
ambiguous to be ontologically meaningful” 
(§19).
« 8 » The upshot of these considerations 
is the following. Kastrup writes that
“ if one is convinced that ontic pancomputation-
alism is absurd in comparison to physicalism, 
then – and on the same basis – one has reason to 
question the plausibility of mainstream physical-
ism in comparison to idealism.” (§7)
But as I have argued, just because a philo-
sophical view makes new and creative use 
of a concept it does not make it necessarily 
absurd. Therefore, I presented a reason to be 
not convinced that ontic pancomputation-
alism is absurd, which means that also the 
claim that mainstream physicalism is absurd 
in comparison to idealism seems less plau-
sible.
« 9 » Now I turn to a second question 
sparked by Kastrup’s article. A main prem-
ise for his argument is that physically objec-
tive matter, matter outside and independent 
of mind, is a “hypothesis” (§6).3 The main 
characteristic of a hypothesis, as it is stan-
dardly construed in philosophy of science, is 
that for some statement to be a hypothesis, 
we must be able to tell, in principle, what 
would count as evidence for or against the 
hypothesis. Broadly construed, the empha-
sis depends on one’s being an adherent of 
verificationism or falsificationism.
« 10 » From the perspective of verifi-
cationism, the hypothesis that needs to be 
verified is: “there is matter outside and in-
dependent of mind.” By definition no con-
structivist is able to provide verification 
for this claim. If we could verify that there 
are objects outside and independent of our 
minds, constructivism would become su-
perfluous. So, this is not a viable route for 
the constructivist.
« 11 » Therefore, we tend to falsification-
ism. As far as I can see, constructivists have 
3 | Or, as Kastrup also puts it, as an “explana-
tory model” (§41). However, since Kastrup seems 
to consider them synonymous, I will only use “hy-
pothesis.”
three options. First, the hypothesis may fail 
because of reality. But what could lead to the 
assumption that our hypothesis failed? Pre-
sumably, it would require nothing less than 
an (evil or benevolent) demon scenario. So, 
imagine we are deceived in thinking that 
there is matter but there are only minds that 
are misled by the demon. But how can we 
find out about this being the case? Since the 
assumption of there being matter is so fun-
damental to all our thoughts and actions, 
it is difficult to imagine what we could ac-
cept as a method of falsifying the alleged 
hypothesis. As far as I can imagine that in 
any given case, I would rather question the 
method used for falsification than give up 
the assumption that matter exists. Even the 
most straightforward way I can think of – a 
thunderous, all-embracing voice in my head 
declaring that it is the demon bewitching me 
– would rather lead me to doubt my sanity 
than give up the assumption of there being 
matter outside of my mind. But, if this is the 
case, falsification of the hypothesis fails.
« 12 » Regarding the second option, 
constructivists could argue that the hypoth-
esis is refuted by factors inherently built into 
our conceptual system. The prime example 
of such a case is Gottlieb Frege’s epiphany af-
ter it had been pointed to him that his theory 
falls prey to Bertrand Russell’s paradox. But 
this is not what Kastrup attempted to show. 
Rather, he tried to convince us that the claim 
that “there is objective matter” resides on a 
higher level of abstraction than that of the 
claim that “there are qualia.” Consequently, 
as it stands, we are not rationally forced by 
system-inherent factors to repudiate the al-
leged hypothesis. Maybe a falsification along 
these lines is possible, but Kastrup has not 
provided it (and this would take quite some 
philosophical work).
« 13 » Third, constructivists could argue 
that the hypothesis is falsified by being su-
perfluous. But, as it stands, this is not a case 
of falsification but of refusing to answer the 
question. I agree that we could discard the 
possibility of matter outside and indepen-
dent of mind from the outset, but this means 
that we are not taking it seriously: we would 
dismiss it from the perspective of a higher 
level of abstraction, as it were.
« 14 » Therefore, as far as I can see, the 
assumption that “there is physically objec-
tive matter outside and independent of my 
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mind” is not a hypothesis but the fundament 
on which most of our hypotheses gain their 
meaning.
sebastian Kletzl wrote his dissertation on the 
epistemology of instrumentation. Other research areas 
include epistemology, (neo)pragmatism, constructivism 
and the philosophy of the Vienna Circle. More to be 
found on https://univie.academia.edu/SebastianKletzl.
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Epistemology, Metaphysics and 
the Preconditions of science
Robert Prentner
ETH Zürich, Switzerland 
robert.prentner/at/phil.gess.ethz.ch
> upshot • Based on epistemological 
considerations, the author of the target 
article proposes an idealist solution to 
the mind-body problem. But is such a 
transition from epistemology to ontol-
ogy justified? This commentary briefly 
asks about the historical motives under-
lying the dichotomy of mind/matter and 
argues that science requires metaphysi-
cal commitments. This gets illustrated 
with respect to some of the material 
mentioned at the end of the target ar-
ticle.
« 1 » In his target article, Bernardo Kas-
trup argues that the dichotomy between 
“mind” and “matter” is ill-conceived. Con-
ventionally it is assumed that mind (i.e., phe-
nomenal consciousness as the author under-
stands it) should eventually be explained in 
terms of matter. This finds its expression to-
day, e.g., in David Chalmer’s (1995) notion 
of the “hard problem of consciousness.” Kas-
trup argues that approaches leading to the 
hard problem are built on a wrong premise: 
“mind” is not the thing that needs explana-
tion. It is the other way around, and “matter” 
is an abstraction that has been posited to ex-
plain the concrete (conscious) experiences 
you and I have. The hard problem is not a 
problem for science but a puzzle stemming 
from metaphysical confusion. It is thus only 
fair to adopt a new metaphysical view that 
respects this asymmetry and avoids similar 
pitfalls. Adopting a new metaphysical view 
might create new such puzzles, but it might 
also lead to new interesting science. In this 
commentary, I am mainly interested in the 
metaphysical alternative and how it could be 
spelled out in terms of an operational frame-
work.
« 2 » The thrust of Kastrup’s argument 
revolves around epistemic asymmetry, i.e., 
the claim that things normally subsumed un-
der the heading of “matter” (particles, fields, 
substances, brains…) epistemologically do 
not stand on the same footing as conscious 
experiences. The former are nothing but ab-
stractions from the latter and “do not reside 
in the same level of explanatory abstraction” 
(§34). The mind/matter dichotomy is ulti-
mately an artifact of language (mis-)use, and 
thus the attempts of “substance-” or “prop-
erty dualism” are problematic from the very 
beginning. Physicalist attempts do not fare 
much better, though, because they approach 
the issue from the wrong side: instead of ac-
knowledging the role of the abstract (“mat-
ter”) to explain the regularities encountered 
by the concrete (experience), physicalists try 
to explain the basis of abstraction itself – us-
ing abstractions. Both the dualist and the 
physicalist project seem thus quite impos-
sible when accepting Kastrup’s arguments.
« 3 » It is interesting to speculate on 
how the mind/matter-dichotomy became 
an “ingrained cultural intuition” (§4) in the 
first place. As far as I see it, intuitions do not 
arise spontaneously, but have a long history. 
In the case of the mind/matter dichotomy, 
things probably go back to the works of 
René Descartes and Galileo Galilei, but, op-
posed to what conventional wisdom tells 
us, it was not just an “intellectual mistake” 
to posit “mind” and “matter” as two distinct 
substances but an important conceptual 
precondition to start the scientific project: 
only if the ghost is expelled from the ma-
chine, does it make sense to speculate about 
“objective” regularities governing the clock-
work-world. Of course, our knowledge has 
increased since then, and it might be time 
to go back and revise some of the original 
assumptions. We now know that the world is 
not clockwork, and we now know that expel-
ling experience from it leads to a dilemma. 
Still, the dichotomy might have had its mer-
its. The lesson to learn (if only history had its 
students) is that changing one’s (metaphysi-
cal) assumptions is sometimes necessary in 
order to start doing science. Kastrup’s article 
can also be read as an invocation to do ex-
actly this, and to start taking consciousness 
seriously again.
« 4 » It is one thing to argue against 
epistemological prejudices. It is another to 
draw (positive) ontological conclusions. It 
is here that I am somewhat unconvinced by 
the solution the author suggests, i.e., ideal-
ism. I am very sympathetic to the idea that 
one might just adopt one’s favored philoso-
phy and see how far it takes one. At the same 
time, I do not see the necessity to espouse 
the idealist standpoint based solely on in-
sights into mental economy (§29) and epis-
temic asymmetry (§§30–35). Granted, ide-
alism seems a natural starting point given 
the arguments presented in the article. But 
is there any reason why idealism is the only 
metaphysical view that acknowledges this 
epistemic asymmetry? For example, Alfred 
North Whitehead’s cosmology, put forth in 
Process and Reality (Whitehead 1978), ex-
plicitly rejects the tendency of ontological 
reification and abstraction. And speaking 
of mental economy: a theory should be as 
simple as possible but not simpler (“Ein-
stein’s razor”).
« 5 » Kastrup’s suggestions raise the 
question of what the author exactly con-
ceives of as “idealism,” in particular because 
he mentions affinities to constructivist ap-
proaches (§39). As one of the authors cited, 
I could say something about our own work, 
which was recently published in this jour-
nal (Fields et al. 2017). We have presented 
a model according to which objects (such 
as the material “abstractions” Kastrup deals 
with in his article) arise as icons on an in-
terface between interacting, experiencing 
agents. While we do acknowledge the pri-
macy of experience of such agents in our 
model (this is our revised metaphysical 
assumption), I am not sure to what extent 
one should classify our work as idealism in 
a strong sense. A crucial task when think-
ing about the relation of consciousness 
and the world is to develop an operational 
framework that shows how the process of 
“abstraction” might work. This is what we 
have outlined in our article (though we did 
not appeal to “abstraction” explicitly). Onto-
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logically, however, this might be compatible 
with many metaphysical views, such as (per-
haps) idealism, conscious realism (Hoffman 
2008), but also forms of aspectual monism 
(Atmanspacher 2014) or processual philos-
ophies (Prentner 2018).
« 6 » ultimately, it might even be the 
case (and this is what I suspect) that differ-
ent metaphysical views will collapse into a 
new philosophy. This is not to say that the 
above views could all be unified, but that a 
novel account will simultaneously satisfy 
some of their basic tenets – the primacy of 
experience, the complementarity of per-
spectives, a metaphysics of “events over 
substances.” One could conjecture that this 
must be in place in order to forge a new sci-
ence of consciousness.
Robert Prentner is an associated lecturer at the 
Department of Humanities, Social and Political 
Science at ETH Zürich and is presently based at the 
University of California, Irvine. He completed a PhD 
on molecular quantum dynamics (2013) and on the 
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of the editorial team of the journal Mind and Matter.
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Is speaking of Mind or Matter 
a Matter of Choice?
Konrad Werner
University of Warsaw, Poland 
konrad.t.werner/at/gmail.com
> upshot • This commentary is centered 
around one issue: it describes a possibil-
ity that, contrary to what the target arti-
cle brings, not only the notion of matter, 
but also the notion of mind is a theoreti-
cal postulate devoted to unpacking our 
complex, concrete and pre-conceptual 
embodiment in the world. Therefore, the 
commentary suggests that there may be 
no difference in abstraction between the 
two notions at stake.
« 1 » The main point rolled out in Ber-
nardo Kastrup’s target article is that the stan-
dard mind/matter division cannot function 
as a plausible conceptual dichotomy because 
these two categories are not epistemically 
symmetrical. The latter means that we have 
direct access to what the term “mind” refers 
to, while the reference of the term “matter” 
results from abstraction. Kastrup aligns with 
Berkeley when he writes that
“ physically objective matter is not empirically 
observable, but a conceptual explanatory device 
abstracted from the patterns and regularities of 
empirical observations – that is, an explanatory 
abstraction.” (§6)
Therefore, aiming at reduction of mind to 
matter is completely misguided as it would 
mean “substituting explanatory abstraction 
for empirical observation” (§7). This is due 
to the fact that mind
“ is the ground within which, and out of which, 
abstractions are made. Matter, in turn, is an ab-
straction of mind […]. This breaks the epistemic 
symmetry between them: we do not know matter 
in the same way that we know mind, for […] mat-
ter is an inference and mind a given.”(§34).
The term “given” constitutes the key issue 
that this commentary is focused on.
« 2 » In old-school epistemology there 
is an approach called foundationalism. In 
short, it holds that if a belief is supposed to 
count as knowledge, its justification can-
not consist of other beliefs only, establish-
ing a coherent system, but must rest on 
something that is not a belief, but still has 
epistemic significance. That is, it must rest 
on an ultimate and firm epistemic ground, 
so to speak (see, e.g., Audi 2003). Empiri-
cal inputs constitute the only family of enti-
ties satisfying this description according to 
the tradition associated with, broadly con-
strued, Locke or Hume while Descartes and 
his followers would insist that specific innate 
ideas or concepts play this role. Someone 
opposing at least empiricist foundationalism 
can endorse, for example, Henri Poincaré’s 
(1958) conventionalism or the more radical 
position taken by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz 
(1934a). A conventionalist would argue that 
empirical data is never sufficient to accept or 
reject a given claim. For acceptance or rejec-
tion must take place within a given concep-
tual apparatus, and this means that there are 
always some extra-empirical, conventional 
factors in play. So, according to the conven-
tionalist, we can never reach the ultimate 
goal set forward by the foundationalist.
« 3 » In my reading, Kastrup’s critique 
of the mind/matter dichotomy takes a foun-
dationalist route of some sort by stipulating 
that our reference to mind is direct, i.e., not 
mediated by abstractions and theoretical 
fictions. On this view, when I use the word 
“mind,” I am in touch with the concreteness 
of my being in the world, as it were. unfortu-
nately, this route seems to be in conflict with 
the somewhat constructivist spirit also ob-
servable in the target article. This is because 
constructivists are more likely to choose the 
conventionalist route not only with respect 
to matter, but also with respect to mind. This 
is not the place to roll out this argument in 
greater detail, but here is the gist. Suppose 
that Maurice Merleau-Ponty, cited in the 
target article, is right and we can speak of 
the “felt presence of conscious perception” 
(§20; see Merleau-Ponty 1964). This means 
that there is a fundamental, non-reducible 
way of attentive and embodied being in the 
world, which is characteristic of all minded 
creatures. This is not, however, a purely spir-
itual, neither a purely “phenomenal” (mean-
ing the what it is like quality) experience, as 
the word “embodied” clearly indicates, but 
an experience attributable to a living, acting 
and self-reflecting body, which can be thought 
of as a whole, “environmentally plugged-in” 
(Alva Noë’s 2009 term) subject. Now, from 
the standpoint of this embodied concrete-
ness of my being in the world, the concept of 
mind also comes up as a result of theoretical 
purification – mind is not an entity I actu-
ally have to do with; speaking of my mind 
can also be regarded as ensuing from a deci-
sion as to which vocabulary to use in order 
to unpack my somewhat multidimensional 
concrete embodiment. So, speaking of mind 
is also a choice – a conventionalist would ar-
gue – and as a choice it is always one of sev-
eral options. Therefore, insofar as the living 
body is concerned, a different choice could 
be to articulate being in the world in terms 
of matter or material aspect, thought of not 
necessarily the way materialists would insist 
on, but, still, as conceptually distinct from 
the mind-related aspect. To sum up, mind-
edness and materiality could be approached 
as two aspects conceptually distinguished 
from the first-person perspective. They pro-
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vide equally abstract grounds for further 
abstractions and further theorizing (as well 
as equally concrete grounds since both of 
these qualities have degrees). From this an-
gle, there is no a priori rationale to prioritize 
mind over matter if both are theoretical pos-
tulates unpacking my concrete being in the 
world: one “purifies” the mental and intel-
lectual aspect while the other one does this 
with the bodily aspect.
« 4 » I shall now articulate my point in 
a different stylization. All our conceptual 
schemata hang, as it were, on a scaffolding 
consisting of the most fundamental, and at 
the same time most abstract concepts and 
conceptual pairs. They are studied in on-
tology and metaphysics.1 The mentioned 
group of concepts includes categories such 
as object, process, relation, and situation. 
The mentioned pairs include: one–many, 
simple–complex, primary–secondary, mat-
ter–form, internal–external (or in–out), po-
tential–actual, part–whole, object–property, 
and mediate–immediate. Such fundamental 
conceptual pairs do not have to be dichoto-
mies, and the paired concepts do not have 
to reside on the same levels of abstraction. 
Take the simple–complex pair, pivotal to 
traditional metaphysicians such as Baruch 
Spinoza or Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. All 
entities we encounter are complex, therefore 
while the idea of complexity abstracts from 
concretes, the notion of simple entity is ab-
stracted from the notion of complexity. So, 
clearly, these two reside on different levels of 
abstraction. Think also of the matter–form 
distinction: it is certainly not a dichotomy 
insofar as each form needs matter to come 
into being; they are rather two aspects of 
one entity. It is crucial to emphasize that 
the entries in any such list of concepts and 
conceptual pairs are semantically mutually 
connected in Ajdukiewicz’s (1934b) sense. 
This means that it is impossible to change 
the meaning of any concept or pair with-
out changing the meanings of the rest. They 
shed light on one another, so to speak, estab-
lishing an abstract system or web.
« 5 » The mind/matter distinction is 
thought of by at least some philosophi-
1 | A reference to such abstract conceptual 
schemata seems to be a rather widely accepted 
assumption among metaphysicians; I follow Jerzy 
Perzanowski’s (1990) formulation.
cal conceptions, e.g., reductive material-
ism on the one hand, and idealism on the 
other, as belonging to the group of the most 
fundamental conceptual pairs. While this 
is not the place to discuss whether or not 
this reading of materialism and idealism is 
correct, my point is that the mind–matter 
case should not be examined in separation 
from a broader ontological and metaphysi-
cal context. Due to the semantic connected-
ness we cannot know what the mind–matter 
pair means if we cut it off from the semantic 
web to which it belongs. Secondly, even if 
mind and matter do not constitute a valid 
dichotomy, they still may remain a pair of 
some other kind (as for example the matter/
form distinction). This prospect of a non-
dichotomic bond between mind and matter 
has not been taken into account or at least 
briefly examined in the target article.
« 6 » Furthermore, drawing on the epis-
temological foundationalism, I propose pro-
visionally that we can also think of a position 
called ontological foundationalism. Given 
the brevity of this commentary I hope that 
the following description lacking all the tech-
nical details is intuitive. One is an ontologi-
cal foundationalist if one holds that within a 
given ontological conceptual apparatus, thus 
among the concepts and conceptual pairs 
examined by ontological theories, there is a 
partly disconnected subset consisting of one 
concept/pair or more, such that their mean-
ings are not affected by any changes in the 
meanings of other concepts. This suggests 
that the partly disconnected group of con-
cepts/pairs owes its meanings exclusively to 
some non-conceptual or extra-conceptual 
factors. Metaphorically speaking, someone 
might claim that they are “dictated” by the 
observable world itself. From this angle, on-
tological foundationalism is the belief that 
some fundamental concepts/pairs or even 
some ontological claims are just “given” to 
us, strike us as obvious, and therefore play a 
privileged role in the conceptual “maps” of 
the world that we draw. Let us consider an 
example. The in‒out (internal–external) pair 
has been regarded by the Cartesian tradi-
tion, broadly construed, as the key distinc-
tion whose meaning does not depend on 
contexts, conventions, decisions, but is just 
given, clean and clear. The in‒out distinc-
tion has set the template for the modern un-
derstanding of cognition (thought of as an 
input-out processing), objectivity (“objec-
tive” means external and independent of the 
internal), subjectivity (“subjective” means 
internal and distinct from the external) and 
numerous more specific issues. So, the on-
tological foundationalist claims that there 
are ontological notions and perhaps also on-
tological claims that maintain some special 
relationship with the world around us and 
this is the base of their credibility.
« 7 » My concern is that Kastrup’s in-
teresting argument rests on a version of 
ontological foundationalism investing the 
concept of mind with this special status. We 
read:
“ [t]o say that mind and matter constitute a di-
chotomy is akin to saying that ripples and water 
constitute a dichotomy. Dichotomies can exist 
only between different kinds of ripples – say, those 
that flow mostly to the right versus those that flow 
mostly to the left – not between ripples and the 
substrate where they ripple. Mind is the substrate 
of the explanatory abstraction we call matter, so 
when we speak of a mind-matter dichotomy we 
fall into a fundamental ‘category mistake’ […]” 
(§36)
Therefore, according to Kastrup, the notion 
of mind grasps the “water” while all other 
concepts grasp the “ripples.” Meanwhile, 
constructivists and conventionalists who 
reject ontological foundationalism, would 
rather say that the “water” is a Kantian thing 
in itself, and the only thing we actually do 
have access to is “ripples.” And both mind 
and matter are “ripples.”
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Author’s Response 
Informing Metaphysical 
Choices with Epistemic 
Considerations
Bernardo Kastrup
> upshot • It is admittedly difficult, if at 
all possible, to establish a direct, positive 
logical bridge from epistemic consider-
ations to ontological conclusions. Yet, 
epistemic considerations can and should 
inform metaphysical choices, for all we 
ultimately have for making these choices 
is our knowledge. More accurately, all we 
finally have is the mind – sole given of 
existence – upon which our knowledge 
resides and within which our metaphysi-
cal choices are made.
« 1 » A general line of criticism in the 
open commentaries is the idea that one can-
not positively derive a metaphysical conclu-
sion (e.g., idealism) purely from epistemic 
considerations of the kind discussed in my 
target article. Robert Prentner indicates this 
in §4 of his commentary, whereas Itay shani 
is even more specific when he remarks that 
epistemic asymmetry “does little to show 
that the metaphysical dichotomy between 
mind and matter is unsound” (§7). While 
I concur with the remark, this is an attack 
on a straw man, for the target article does 
not seek to point out internal metaphysical 
inconsistencies in any given ontology. As ex-
plicitly highlighted in my §40, it is not even 
intended as a direct metaphysical argument 
– contrary to what Chris Fields and sebastian 
Kletzl, in §1 of their respective commentar-
ies, suggest. As such, the claim that my at-
tempt has been that of “deriving metaphysi-
cal idealism from epistemological idealism” 
(shani §12) is not accurate. My metaphysical 
argument for idealism was made elsewhere 
(Kastrup 2018).
« 2 » So, let me be clear: what the target 
article attempts is to highlight that different 
ontologies inherently carry different epis-
temic costs, i.e., degrees of epistemic confi-
dence, even if these ontologies are internally 
consistent. And whereas this is admittedly 
not a metaphysical argument, it undoubt-
edly has great relevance in informing one’s 
choice of metaphysics, since all that is avail-
able for making this choice is one’s knowl-
edge. The degree to which one’s knowledge 
is reliable should be a factor – perhaps even 
a defining factor – in the choice.
Physically objective matter can 
only be accessed conceptually
« 3 » shani’s objections are particularly 
specific. In §4 of his commentary he writes:
“ Kastrup’s entire argument is founded upon the 
assertion that matter is an abstraction of mind. 
[…] [But] while the concept of matter is contin-
gent upon the constructive activities of mind, in 
no way does this prove that the denotation of the 
concept – namely, matter itself, should it exist – is 
thereby contingent upon such acts.”
I entirely agree with this and nothing in the 
target article contradicts it, at least deliber-
ately. However, the intended point, which 
shani misses, is this: unlike mind, our sole 
access to matter operates through the concept 
of matter, for perceptions are themselves 
mental. Therefore, insofar as we can directly 
know, the existence of matter is limited to 
the existence of the mere concept of matter. 
And since this concept – as shani acknowl-
edges – is itself just as mental as perceptions, 
the existence of the non-mental substrate it 
denotes is doubtful.
« 4 » The relevance of shani’s argument 
here is contingent upon the existence of 
matter itself (after all, if matter itself does 
not exist, its alleged mind-independence is 
immaterial), but the very thrust of the target 
article is precisely to question the appropri-
ateness of our confidence in this existence, 
in the first place.
« 5 » shani continues: “It seems a logi-
cal fallacy to conclude that matter itself is 
mind-dependent simply because such is the 
predicament of the concept of matter” (§4). 
This conclusion would indeed be a glaring 
logical fallacy. However, the target article 
never advances it. The article is explicit in 
stating that matter, as a concept, denotes a 
mind-independent ontological class (e.g., 
§3). Whenever the article asserts that mat-
ter is an “abstraction of mind” (§§34, 41), 
what is meant by the word “matter” in the 
respective context is the concept of matter. 
This should be clear throughout the article, 
as, e.g., in §6 (“physically objective matter 
is not empirically observable, but a concep-
tual explanatory device,” emphasis added). 
In §41 the word “matter” is even defined as 
an “explanatory model,” i.e., a conceptual 
construct. The target article’s very point is to 
show that, given certain epistemic consid-
erations, one must be skeptical that there is 
anything more to matter than the mere con-
cept alone. In other words, what is meant is 
that, insofar as it can be directly known, mat-
ter is no more than a concept and, as such, an 
abstraction of mind.
« 6 » shani argues that dichotomous 
pairs may be simply opposite polarities of 
a spectrum of gradations (§8) and thus not 
necessarily jointly exhaustive, as assumed 
in the target article. This is largely a matter 
of word usage. The target article clearly and 
explicitly defines “dichotomy” in a sense ap-
propriate for its argument (§§1 and 30), for 
mind and matter today are not seen as oppo-
site polarities of a continuous spectrum, but 
as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive 
ontological classes. Contemporary culture 
largely acknowledges that aspects of nature 
may be either mental or material, but not 
that there are aspects of nature somewhere 
in between mentality and materiality (see 
§§1f). Even when mental and material prop-
erties are assumed to always occur together 
or to fundamentally correspond to one an-
other in some sense (as, e.g., in most for-
mulations of panpsychism), the respective 
properties are still seen as mutually exclu-
sive and jointly exhaustive. In other words, 
even under panpsychism, each individual 
property of nature is either mental or mate-
rial, not something in between. The defini-
tion used in the article is thus appropriate.
« 7 » More substantively, it is crucial 
to notice that, unlike what shani suggests 
in §9 of his commentary, the target article 
never argues that there is a dichotomy – in 
the sense discussed above – between ideal-
ism and mainstream physicalism. The article 
argues against a dichotomy solely between 
mind and matter, which in turn becomes the 
basis for the later claim that idealism and 
mainstream physicalism are not mirror im-
ages of each other.
« 8 » unlike the above, the point made 
in §11 of shani’s commentary, although di-
rected at a single claim in the target article 
and benign as far as its overall argument is 
concerned, is one I unreservedly agree with. 
It appropriately limits the scope of validity of 
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my claim – namely, the claim that “steps of 
explanatory abstraction can only be justified 
if the relevant empirical observations cannot 
be explained without them” (§20) – to cases 
wherein the manner in which a theory de-
rives the familiar world around us does not 
become disproportionally convoluted.
« 9 » Fields points out that the target 
article does not rigorously define what is 
meant by “matter,” in the scientific sense 
(§2). If this is so, it is because I assumed that, 
by referring to mainstream physicalism, the 
appropriate definitions would be implicitly 
inherited. What matters is that, under phys-
icalism, the ontological primitive(s) is(are) 
always “physically objective,” which the 
target article does explicitly define as some-
thing “outside and independent of mind” 
(§6). The more popular physicalist formula-
tions take the fundamental subatomic par-
ticles in the Standard Model for primitives. 
Others take the quantum field, the hyper-
dimensional “branes” of M-theory, etc. The 
argument in the target article is agnostic as 
to which particular primitive is applicable, 
so long as it is an entity outside and inde-
pendent of mind. Therefore, to simplify and 
focus the discussion on the relevant points, 
the target article simply uses the colloquial 
word “matter,” whatever its meaning may be 
within one’s preferred formulation of physi-
calism.
Is spacetime itself fundamentally 
experiential?
« 10 » Fields’s discussion in §§6 to 9 is 
interesting and appropriate, as it touches on 
a critical issue: by speaking of experiences as 
“excitations of mind,” the target article pre-
supposes a spacetime framework insofar as 
one visualizes excitation as vibration. Since 
vibration is movement in space and time, 
this seems to distinguish spacetime from 
experience, for experience now needs to un-
fold within preexisting spacetime.
« 11 » Yet, I acknowledge what I believe 
to be Fields’s point: insofar as we can directly 
know them, both space and time are but 
qualities of experience. What we call “past” 
is an experiential quality characteristic of 
memory and “future” an experiential qual-
ity characteristic of imagined possibilities or 
expectations. Space, in turn, is the experien-
tial quality of a certain relationship between 
perceived objects.
« 12 » The problem is that even an on-
tological idealist is linguistically forced to 
presuppose a spacetime scaffolding – at least 
metaphorically – when they open their pro-
verbial mouths, for space and time are built 
into the fabric of language (nouns denote 
things that exist in space, verbs actions that 
unfold in time, etc.). This is a concession to 
the limitations of language, not necessarily 
a metaphysical concession. When the ideal-
ist says that experiences are like vibrations of 
consciousness, they do not necessarily con-
cede primacy to spacetime over experience, 
but may mean simply that the spacetime-
bound notion of vibration corresponds – in 
some admittedly metaphorical, illustrative, 
but nonetheless accurate sense – to an inef-
fable ontological fact.
There is no excuse for conceptual 
ambiguity in analytic philosophy
« 13 » Kletzl’s commentary centers on 
my critique of ontic pancomputationalism, 
which is illustrative of, but not central to, 
my argument. Kletzl claims that the ground 
of my critique is that I do “not agree with 
the concept of ‘information’ employed by 
pancomputationalists” (§2). This is not ac-
curate: my point is that pancomputational-
ists do not even have an unambiguous defi-
nition of information for me to either agree 
or disagree with.
« 14 » Kletzl argues that, even with inher-
ent ambiguity, a concept can still be useful: 
“it seems dubious to say that we must be able 
to clearly define what a concept means for it 
to be meaningful” (§3). Whereas I acknowl-
edge that conceptual vagueness may not be 
so problematic in certain areas of human 
intellectual activity – say, art criticism, po-
etry or clinical psychology – when it comes 
to analytic philosophy, particularly ontology, 
it ought to be considered fatal. A concept 
meant to denote an ontological class must 
unambiguously specify and delineate this 
ontological class; otherwise one literally does 
not know what one is talking about. To talk of 
pure information as the ground of existence 
without unambiguously specifying what one 
means – and does not mean – by “informa-
tion” strikes me as hand waving at best.
« 15 » Kletzl points out that the mean-
ings we attribute to certain concepts change 
radically over time. He asks: “Why should 
‘information’ be immune to this possibil-
ity of changing its meaning? And does this 
make this concept ultimately meaningless?” 
(§3). So long as, at each point in time, one 
has clarity about what one means by the 
concept, the answer is no. But my critique of 
ontic pancomputationalism is not that the 
definition of “information” changes over 
time, but that it has not been unambiguous 
at any point up until now. This does make 
ontic pancomputationalism literally mean-
ingless, at least until its supporters finally 
define “information” unambiguously.
« 16 » §4 of Kletzl’s commentary is a non 
sequitur. I concur that ideal conceptual defi-
nitions are impractical and that a concept 
is already ontologically useful if it is de-
fined “well enough” (wherein “well enough” 
means that “the relevant peer group accepts 
the definition as sufficiently exact”). But “in-
formation” is not defined “well enough” in 
this sense; that is, the peer group of analytic 
philosophers dealing with metaphysics and, 
more particularly, ontology, does not accept 
the definition as sufficiently exact (even if 
ontic pancomputationalists somehow do!). 
To then suggest that all other concepts used 
today by this peer group are as ambiguous 
as “information” in ontic pancomputation-
alism is simply unsound.
« 17 » In §§5f of his commentary, Kletzl 
makes much of my passing assertion that 
Claude Shannon’s definition of informa-
tion is “intuitive.” But he misses the point, 
which is that Shannon’s definition, unlike 
the morass of ontic pancomputationalism, 
is clear and unambiguous; so much so that 
we can precisely quantify information – as 
defined – through mathematics and design 
our entire modern communication net-
works based on the definition and respec-
tive quantification procedures. Kletzl’s criti-
cism of my “insisting on a common-sense 
status quo expressed by the majority” is a 
straw man. I insisted on no such a thing.
« 18 » In §6 of his commentary, Kletzl 
says that “the mind/matter dichotomy [Kas-
trup] is concerned with is not a distinction 
that plays a role in laypeople’s lives.” I find 
this a surprising view, for clearly the dichot-
omy does play an obviously significant role 
in most people’s lives: it is the abstracting 
away of matter from mind that underlies, 
for instance, death anxiety, dualist religions, 
arguably consumerism, etc. See, e.g., He-
flick et al. (2015).
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Philosophical hypotheses are not 
scientific hypotheses
« 19 » Finally, the discussion in §§9 to 
14 of Kletzl’s commentary is rather confused. 
Specifically, Kletzl tries to apply criteria for the 
assessment of scientific hypotheses to what is 
in fact a metaphysical hypothesis (namely, 
the existence of physically objective matter). 
A scientific hypothesis always entails, or at 
least implies, a predictive model of nature’s 
behavior, which can then be either verified or 
falsified by observation of such behavior. A 
metaphysical hypothesis, on the other hand, 
consists of a particular interpretation of sci-
entific models – and therefore, indirectly, of 
nature’s behavior – based on, or leading to, 
a certain inference about what nature essen-
tially is (as opposed to how it behaves).
« 20 » There are admittedly grey areas 
between these two types of hypotheses: I 
have claimed, for instance, that idealism is 
more consistent with both physical1 and neu-
roscientific (Kastrup 2017e) observations 
than mainstream physicalism. Nonetheless, 
a metaphysical hypothesis should be assessed 
not only in terms of its consistency with sci-
ence – all serious metaphysical hypotheses 
are mostly consistent with science, anyway, 
even though they contradict one another – 
but also in terms of parsimony, internal logi-
cal consistency and epistemic cost (the latter 
being the subject of the target article). unlike 
what Kletzl suggests, such a metaphysical as-
sessment never leads to a definitive binary 
answer – otherwise all key metaphysical 
problems would already have been solved – 
but to an educated judgment call.
« 21 » For instance, I cannot definitely 
falsify the metaphysical hypothesis that the 
Flying Spaghetti Monster determines the 
outcome of all probabilistic quantum events 
from a higher dimension; but I can make 
the judgment call that such a hypothesis is 
overly unparsimonious and epistemically 
unreliable. Informed by epistemic cost con-
siderations, I can make an analogous call re-
garding the metaphysical hypothesis of mat-
1 | See my “Should quantum anomalies make 
us rethink reality? Inexplicable lab results may be 
telling us we’re on the cusp of a new scientific 
paradigm,” Scientific American Blog Network, 
19 April 2018, at https://blogs.scientificamerican.
com/observations/should-quantum-anomalies-
make-us-rethink-reality
ter outside and independent of mind. unlike 
what Kletzl suggests in §11 of his commen-
tary, making these or other metaphysical as-
sessments requires no “demon scenario.” It is 
simply a matter of reason.
« 22 » Given all this, Kletzl’s conclusion 
that “the assumption that ‘there is physically 
objective matter outside and independent of 
my mind’ is not a hypothesis but the funda-
ment on which most of our hypotheses gain 
their meaning” (§14) is arbitrary and begs 
the question by assuming the very point in 
contention.
« 23 » On a related note, Prentner argues 
that the metaphysical hypothesis behind 
mainstream physicalism – namely, that mat-
ter exists outside and independently of mind 
– has served useful purposes in the scientific 
development of our civilization. I have ac-
knowledged this in an earlier work:
“ Physicalism has served important practical pur-
poses over the past couple of centuries. It has pro-
vided scientists and engineers with an effective—if 
simplistic and ultimately wrong—picture of the 
world, conducive to the development of technol-
ogy. By thinking of objects and natural phenom-
ena as having standalone reality independent of 
their own minds, practitioners could achieve the 
degree of detachment and objectivity necessary for 
describing the world without bias. The predictive 
models of nature’s behavior that resulted from this 
effort now lie at the foundation of our technologi-
cal civilization.” (Kastrup 2017c: 8)
« 24 » Yet, mainstream physicalism 
also creates “wild goose chases,” such as 
the search for the biological basis of con-
sciousness, which was selected by Science 
magazine, in its 125th anniversary edition, 
as the second most important unanswered 
question in science today. In my view, main-
stream physicalism has outlived its useful-
ness as a paradigm and, today, it is a net li-
ability to the progress of human thought.
Mind, or phenomenal consciousness, 
is existence’s sole given
« 25 » Fields questions whether the no-
tion of phenomenal consciousness, or the 
“substrate or ground of experience,” is not 
itself an abstraction – just as much as the 
concept of matter is – given that all we ac-
tually know directly are qualia (§§5f). The 
question presupposes an ontological distinc-
tion between qualia – i.e., the qualities of raw 
experience – and phenomenal consciousness 
to begin with. Yet, the attempt in the target 
article has been precisely to avoid this dis-
tinction: it defines “mind” as “phenomenal 
consciousness” (§9) and qualia or experi-
ences as “excitations of mind” (§10). There 
is thus no ontological distinction between 
mind and qualia, for the same reason that 
there is no ontological distinction between a 
dance and the dancer, ripples and water. A 
dance is simply the dancer in motion; ripples 
are just water in motion. Similarly, qualia are 
just mind “in motion.” In the absence of an 
ontological distinction, if qualia are a given 
and not an abstraction – as Fields acknowl-
edges – then mind, phenomenal conscious-
ness, the substrate or ground of experience 
is also a given and not an abstraction. This is 
not a linguistic sleight of hand, but precisely 
a careful attempt to avoid linguistic artifacts.
« 26 » Therefore, the comparison Fields 
attempts in §10 of his commentary is not 
applicable: whereas the “ground of experi-
ence” is a given, the ground of information 
– insofar as it is assumed not to be the same 
as the ground of experience – is not a given. 
This is precisely what allows ontic pancom-
putationalists to reject the ground of infor-
mation and look upon information itself as 
the ontic foundation of reality. The target 
article characterizes this position as absurd 
because – amongst other reasons – ontic 
pancomputationalists offer no unambiguous 
definition of information. While Fields dis-
agrees with this characterization – in §12 of 
his commentary he claims that it “is clearly 
question-begging, as any proponent of ontic 
information would claim that information is 
a ‘natural entity’” – he offers no definition 
of information either. So, my point stands: 
What sense is there in attributing all onto-
logical value to an undefined – or, at best, 
loosely and ambiguously defined – entity?
« 27 » Konrad Werner raises a point anal-
ogous to Fields’s: that mind – just as physi-
cally objective matter – may also be no more 
than an abstract conceptual entity. unlike 
Fields, however, Werner justifies his point not 
by distinguishing mind from qualia, but by 
implicitly using the word “mind” in a way 
subtly different from what is meant in the 
target article (§9). It is this subtle linguistic 
sleight of hand – unintentional, as I am con-
vinced it was – that I shall elaborate upon.
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« 28 » Werner initially interprets my 
point as intended:
“ In my reading, Kastrup’s critique of the mind/
matter dichotomy takes a foundationalist route of 
some sort by stipulating that our reference to mind 
is direct, i.e., not mediated by abstractions and 
theoretical fictions.” (§3)
My usage definition of the word “mind” in §9 
of the target article makes this clear.
« 29 » But he then proceeds to subtly 
mean something else by the word in subse-
quent paragraphs. He talks of “mind” and 
“matter” as belonging to a connected “se-
mantic web,” their meanings being relative, 
determined by the mutual semantic relation-
ships in the web (§5). This is only tenable if 
he is talking about the conceptual constel-
lation that can be associated with the word 
“mind.” After all, as a flexible word, “mind” 
can indeed be part of a semantic web. But 
what is specifically denoted in §9 of the tar-
get article can be directly referenced and, as 
such, is not relative to the relationships in a 
semantic web.
« 30 » Where do semantic webs them-
selves exist, if not in mind? Werner says 
“speaking of mind is also a choice” (§3). 
Where is this choice made, if not in mind? 
underlying the concept “mind” there nec-
essarily is mind itself; that within which, 
and out of which, all conceptualizations are 
made. underlying philosophical discourse 
there necessarily is the mind that hosts the 
discourse. This should be so self-evident as 
to obviate the need to say it, but we are now 
so “lost in a forest of intellectually appealing 
but ultimately arbitrary conceptualizations” 
(§29 of the target article) that I do need to say 
it. As such, if anything, Werner’s commentary 
illustrates the very situation the target article 
expresses anxiety about, thereby highlight-
ing the article’s relevance.
« 31 » This point is so important I want 
to belabor it before closing this response. I 
harbor no illusions about my ability to use 
concepts clearly and rigorously: it may be – 
and at least occasionally it surely is – flawed. 
Perhaps the target article falls short in this 
regard. But shortcomings aside, all this – the 
target article, the open commentaries, this 
response, philosophy in general, discourse in 
general, life in general – must be, insofar as it 
exists, grounded in an existent. And the only 
existent we know directly, independently 
of theoretical abstractions, is what we call 
“mind.” I could even define “mind” in this 
manner, without doing injustice to the col-
loquial meaning of the word: mind – includ-
ing its “contents” or “excitations” – is all you 
and I knew when we were infants, prior to 
the shifting phantasmagoria of theory that 
came thereafter.
« 32 » If “mind” is an inappropriate word 
to denote this irrefutable, given existent, 
then we can try others (“consciousness”? 
“psyche”?). But whatever the choice, nothing 
would change about the existent; it would re-
main what it is, irrespective of our tortuous 
conceptualizations and abstract contortions. 
Without this existent, there would be nothing 
to talk about.
« 33 » At the foundation of all semantic 
webs, all post-modern relativism and de-
constructionism, is the Mind that abstracts 
“mind” into a relative, debatable concept. 
That Mind is what I mean by “mind” in the 
target article. Denying that that Mind is a 
given is, in the words of Galen Strawson, “the 
silliest claim ever made.”2
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